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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays that study the macroeconomics of health
care. The first essay studies how policies can be designed to reduce differences in life
expectancy across income groups in the United States and examines what the conse-
quences of these policies are for welfare and the macroeconomy. Using a calibrated
structural life cycle model with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents, and en-
dogenous health, I find that a universal health insurance reform leads to higher life
expectancy, lower life expectancy inequality, lower health care spending, higher GDP
per capita, and higher welfare, even after controlling for the increased tax burden
needed to finance the reform. The second essay develops a structural life cycle model
with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents to study how the ability to file for
medical bankruptcy affects incentives to purchase health insurance. I find that the
ability to file for medical bankruptcy crowds out private health insurance coverage.
The majority of the population, however, is better off in the economy with medical
bankruptcy because of the implicit insurance provided by this option. Finally, moti-
vated by the considerable heterogeneity in GDP per capita across the states of the US,
the third essay develops a model to quantify the welfare differences across the states
as measured by the expected lifetime utility of being born in a particular state. Using a
calibrated version of the model that allows for state-specific variation in mortality risk,
consumption uncertainty, and educational attainment, I document large and persistent
heterogeneity in welfare across the states of the US.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation consists of an introductory chapter and three essays that study the macroe-
conomics of health care. This chapter provides a brief summary of the motivation, methods,
and findings of each essay.
The richest 25 percent of Americans can expect to live about 7 years longer than the
poorest 25 percent. Chapter 2 of my dissertation studies how policies can be designed to
reduce life expectancy inequality and examines what the consequences of these policies
are for welfare and the macroeconomy. To do this, I develop a structural life cycle model
with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents. In the model, agents’ health evolves
endogenously depending on the healthiness of their consumption basket. I calibrate the
model to match several facts about the population health distribution that I document by
constructing an objective measure of health called a frailty index. I show that there ex-
ists considerable heterogeneity in frailty in the population. To illustrate, 20-year-olds in
the fourth frailty quartile are more frail than 50-year-olds in the first frailty quartile, even
though the former group is 30 years younger than the latter. These differences in frailty
have large implications for mortality risk, medical expenditure risk, and labor market out-
comes. I then use the model to study the implications of health insurance and income tax
reforms for life expectancy, life expectancy inequality, the macroeconomy, and welfare. I
find that universal health insurance leads to higher life expectancy, lower life expectancy
inequality, lower health care spending, higher GDP per capita, and higher welfare, even
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after controlling for the increased tax burden needed to finance the reform. Similarly, I
find that the government can reduce life expectancy inequality by expanding Medicaid or
by increasing redistribution through income tax reforms but that these reforms can have
adverse implications for the macroeconomy.
Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code allows individuals to discharge their medical debt
by filing for bankruptcy. Chapter 3 of my dissertation studies how the ability to file for
medical bankruptcy affects incentives to purchase private health insurance. To do this, I
develop a structural life cycle model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous agents
that can account for salient features of the US health insurance system and Chapter 7 of the
US bankruptcy code. I find that the ability to file for medical bankruptcy lowers the private
insurance take-up rate by 2.0 percentage points. This means that 8 percent of the uninsured
working-age population would take up private health insurance coverage if they did not
have the option to file for medical bankruptcy. I then compute a transition from an economy
with to an economy without medical bankruptcy to quantify the welfare implications of this
law. I find that aggregate welfare is higher and that 79.6 percent of the population is better
off in the economy with medical bankruptcy because of the implicit insurance provided by
this option.
GDP per capita ranges by more than a factor of 2 across the states of the US. Chapter
4 of my dissertation develops a model to quantify the welfare differences across the states
of the US as measured by the expected lifetime utility of being born in a particular state.
The model allows for state-specific variation in mortality risk, consumption uncertainty,
and educational attainment. I show that there exists considerable heterogeneity in welfare
across the states. To illustrate, I find that consumption must be scaled down by 47 percent
in all ages in the state with the highest welfare level, Massachusetts, to make a hypotheti-
cal agent indifferent between living her entire life in Massachusetts and the state with the
2
lowest welfare level, Mississippi. Moreover, these differences are very persistent. Accord-
ingly, although the lower ranked states in 2000 have generally experienced a higher welfare
growth than the higher ranked states in 2000, there does not appear to be evidence of rapid
convergence toward similar welfare levels.
3
Chapter 2
Causes and consequences of life
expectancy inequality
4
2.1 Introduction
Recent research by Chetty et al. (2016) shows that, at age 40, the richest quartile of Amer-
icans can expect to live about 7 years longer than the poorest quartile. Moreover, this
difference in life expectancy, commonly referred to as life expectancy inequality, has in-
creased over time. Since 2001, men in the top earnings quartile have experienced a 2.8 year
increase in their life expectancy, compared to only a 1.1 year increase for men in the bottom
earnings quartile. This chapter studies how policies can be designed to reduce the dispar-
ities in life expectancy between high- and low-income individuals. To do this, I develop
a structural life cycle model with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents, and endoge-
nous health that can account for the observed health distribution by age and income in the
United States. I then use the model to study how policies that redistribute more resources
from the rich to the poor such as an expansion of public health insurance programs or an
increase in income tax progressivity affect life expectancy, life expectancy inequality, the
macroeconomy, and welfare.
Since the objective of the paper is to understand how policies can be designed to reduce
life expectancy inequality and to examine what the consequences of these policies are for
welfare and the macroeconomy, it is important that the model closely matches both the
determinants of health and the implications of health over the life cycle. I therefore start by
documenting how health affects mortality risk, medical expenditure risk, and labor market
outcomes, and show how health varies in the population with age and socioeconomic status.
To do this, I use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), a longitudinal
study that collects detailed annual records on health indicators, medical spending, insurance
coverage, income, and demographics for a representative sample of non-institutionalized
individuals in the United States. To get a continuous and objective measure of an individ-
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ual’s health, I follow conventions in the gerontology literature (see e.g. Searle et al. 2008)
and approximate an individual’s health by her frailty index. This index counts how many
health deficits the individual has. Health deficits are defined as disabilities and diseases,
some examples of which include functional limitations, cognitive impairments, and health
conditions such as cancer and diabetes.
Using this measure, I document the following facts. First, there is considerable hetero-
geneity in frailty in the population. To illustrate, 20-year-olds in the fourth frailty quartile
(that is, the sickest 25 percent) are more frail than 50-year-olds in the first frailty quartile
(that is, the healthiest 25 percent), even though the former group is 30 years younger than
the latter. Next, there is a strong relationship between frailty and socioeconomic status as
measured by educational attainment, income, and wealth. Across all age groups, educated
individuals are less frail than non-educated individuals, low-income individuals are more
frail than high-income individuals, and wealth-rich individuals are less frail than wealth-
poor individuals. Moreover, these differences are economically significant. As an example,
the healthiest 25 percent of 65-year-olds have 4 times higher median net wealth than the
sickest 25 percent.
These differences in frailty have considerable implications for mortality risk, medical ex-
penditure risk, and labor market outcomes. An increase in frailty leads to a large reduction
in age-specific survival probabilities. To illustrate, the sickest 25 percent of 85-year-olds
have a 3 times higher mortality probability than the healthiest 25 percent. Higher frailty
also leads to increased medical expenditure risk. I find that average annual medical spend-
ing for 20-64 year-olds is about $1,200 for individuals in the lowest frailty quartile. In
contrast, 20-64 year-olds in the fourth frailty quartile spend an average of $9,600 on health
care. Similarly, the healthiest and sickest 25 percent of elderly spend an average of $3,400
and $17,200 per year on health care, respectively. Lastly, I examine how frailty affects
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labor market outcomes. I find a negative relationship between frailty and labor produc-
tivity as measured by hourly wage rates. In particular, I find that, conditional on initial
wage rates, higher frailty is associated with a reduction in wage rates in the following year.
Similarly, I find that, conditional on initial hourly labor supply, higher frailty is associated
with a reduction in the number of hours worked per week in the following year. More
importantly, frailty has large implications for labor force participation. As an example, I
find that the sickest 25 percent of 50-year-olds have a 34 percentage point lower labor force
participation rate than the healthiest 25 percent.
I then develop a structural life cycle model with incomplete markets and heterogeneous
agents that can account for these facts. In the model, agents are heterogeneous along the
dimensions of age, frailty, assets, labor productivity, medical spending, education, and
health insurance coverage. Consistent with the health insurance system in the United States,
health insurance is available in the form of private insurance, employer-provided insurance,
Medicare, and Medicaid. The model also features a Social Security program that provides
pensions to the elderly. As in the data, frailty has implications for longevity, medical ex-
penditure risk, and labor market outcomes. In particular, an increase in frailty leads to
lower survival probabilities and higher expected medical costs. In addition, higher frailty
also lowers the agent’s labor productivity and increases the agent’s disutility of working,
thereby increasing the probability that the agent will leave the labor force. This latter part
enables me to match the large negative relationship between frailty and labor force partici-
pation rates in the data.
In the model, agents derive utility from consumption of healthy and unhealthy goods, and
disutility from working. Their frailty evolves endogenously over the life cycle depending
on their age, education, and choice of consumption basket. In particular, agents can im-
prove their frailty transition probabilities by choosing a healthier consumption basket. This
7
mechanism that frailty transitions depend on the healthiness of the agent’s consumption
basket is motivated by a large literature in medicine that studies the health consequences
of healthy and unhealthy eating. To illustrate, Danaei et al. (2009) show that poor diets
are among the leading causes of obesity, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and diet-related
cancers. Estimates by Murray et al. (2013) suggest that dietary factors account for about
25 percent of deaths in the United States and about 14 percent of all disability-adjusted
life-years lost. Similar results are reported by Lim et al. (2012), who show that dietary risk
factors and physical inactivity are among the leading drivers of disability and mortality,
with the most prominent dietary risks being diets low in fruits and those high in sodium.
I assume that healthy and unhealthy goods are perfect substitutes, but that unhealthy
goods have a lower relative price. This is motivated by evidence from the medical lit-
erature (see e.g. Drewnowski and Specter (2004) and Drewnowski (2010)) that show that
healthier foods such as fruits and vegetables tend to have a higher price per calorie than less
healthy foods such as sweets and processed meats. Agents in the model therefore face a
tradeoff between higher current period consumption and lower next-period expected frailty.
In the model, optimal expected life span is longer for the rich than for the poor, which can
only be achieved by investing more in healthy consumption. High-income agents therefore
consume healthier baskets over the life cycle than low-income agents, which in turn leads
to increasing frailty disparities between the income groups. Consistent with this, Rehm et
al. (2016) document large variations in diet quality across both income and educational
groups. To illustrate, they show that more than 60 percent of low-income individuals have
a diet that is classified as poor by the American Heart Association because of its negative
implications for various health outcomes such as cardiovascular diseases. In contrast, less
than 30 percent of middle-income individuals have a diet that is classified as poor.
I calibrate the model to match the distribution of frailty by age and income in the pop-
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ulation. Recall that the law of motion for frailty depends on the healthiness of the agent’s
consumption basket in the model. Since I do not observe consumption in the MEPS, I can-
not estimate frailty transition probabilities directly from the data. I therefore use an indirect
inference approach to calibrate the coefficients of the frailty transition matrix. In particular,
since income predicts next-period frailty in the data, I calibrate the parameters of the model
such that the model matches this relationship between income and next-period frailty. To
do this, I first estimate a relationship between frailty and past frailty, age, income, and
education using data from the MEPS. I then run the same regression on simulated data
from the model. Lastly, I iterate on the preference parameters and on the coefficients of
the frailty transition matrix until these two regressions coincide. This means that the model
generates a relationship between income and next-period frailty that is consistent with what
we observe in the data. Finally, since the way I model frailty coincides exactly with the
way I measure frailty in the data, I can estimate how frailty affects mortality risk, medical
expenditure risk, and labor market outcomes directly from the data.
After verifying that the model can account for both the frailty facts documented in this
chapter and the relationship between income and life expectancy documented by Chetty
et al. (2016), I then use the model to study how policies can be designed to reduce life
expectancy inequality. Recall that frailty affects income through its effect on labor pro-
ductivity and labor force participation. In addition, income indirectly affects frailty by
facilitating higher consumption of healthy goods. There is therefore a two-way relation-
ship, or a feedback loop, between income and frailty in the model. In particular, high
frailty leads to low income, which in turn leads to lower consumption of healthy goods,
which in turn leads to higher next-period expected frailty. This mechanism implies that
the government might be able to improve population health outcomes by expanding public
health insurance programs or by increasing income tax progressivity, both of which facili-
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tate higher investments in healthy consumption in times of high medical costs or low labor
productivity. To test this hypothesis, I first study a counterfactual economy with universal
health insurance. In particular, I consider an economy where the government covers 86.2
percent of all health care expenses, and finances these costs through higher income taxes. I
find that the reform leads to a 0.10 year increase in average life expectancy and a 0.41 year
reduction in longevity differences at age 40 by income quartile due to higher investments
in healthy consumption, especially among the previously uninsured. The improvements in
the population health distribution leads to a 0.18 percent decline in health care spending per
capita. Moreover, I find that GDP per capita increases by 0.50 percent due to both higher
capital accumulation and higher labor supply. Because of these results, I find that the uni-
versal health insurance reform leads to higher ex ante welfare, even after controlling for the
increased tax burden needed to finance the reform. In particular, I find that consumption
must increase by 1.82 percent in all periods and contingencies in the benchmark economy
to make an unborn agent under the veil of ignorance indifferent between the benchmark
economy and the economy with universal health insurance.
I then compare the results from the universal health insurance reform with the results
from two Medicaid reforms designed to increase insurance coverage among low-income
agents. In particular, motivated by the recent Medicaid expansion under the Affordable
Care Act, I first examine the effects of expanding Medicaid to all agents with income
no greater than 138 percent of the federal poverty level, and then examine the effects of
expanding Medicaid to all agents with income net of medical expenses no greater than 138
percent of the federal poverty level. For brevity, I refer to the two reforms as the categorical
and medically needy reform, respectively. Consistent with the universal health insurance
reform, I find that both Medicaid reforms lead to higher average life expectancy and lower
life expectancy inequality as measured by the difference in life expectancy at age 40 by
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income quartile. Unlike the universal heath insurance reform, however, both Medicaid
reforms have negative implications for the macroeconomy. To illustrate, I find that the
medically needy reform leads to a 2.89 percent decline in consumption per capita and a
2.38 percent reduction in GDP per capita. These findings are driven by the observation
that Medicaid discourages saving and working since eligibility for the program is tied to
income. That is, uninsured agents with high medical costs have an incentive to reduce their
saving and labor supply to qualify for the program. In contrast, these distortions are not
present in the economy with universal health insurance since eligibility for public health
insurance is independent of the agent’s income in that environment.
Lastly, I examine how life expectancy is affected by the progressivity of the income tax
schedule, which in turn governs the level of redistribution between the rich and the poor in
the economy. I do this by comparing the benchmark model results with the results derived
using three alternative income tax schedules: a proportional tax schedule, a tax schedule
characterized by higher maximum but lower average marginal rates, and a tax schedule
characterized by higher maximum marginal rates but also higher deductions for low-income
agents. I find a positive relationship between tax progressivity and average life expectancy,
and a negative relationship between tax progressivity and life expectancy inequality. In
particular, life expectancy inequality is 0.33 years higher in the economy with proportional
taxes than in the benchmark model, but 0.80 years lower in the environment with higher tax
deductions. Similarly, I find a negative relationship between tax progressivity and health
care spending. To illustrate, I find that health care spending per capita is 0.43 percent higher
in the environment with proportional taxes than in the benchmark model, but 1.03 percent
lower in the environment with higher tax deductions. On the other hand, consistent with
the optimal tax literature, I find that higher tax progressivity leads to lower GDP per capita
due to increased disincentive effects to both save and work for agents at the high end of
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the income distribution. Therefore, these findings suggest that policymakers can reduce
life expectancy disparities by increasing tax progressivity, but that the gains from such
reforms must be weighed against their adverse implications for labor supply and capital
accumulation.
Related literature: This chapter relates to the literature that studies the relationship be-
tween socioeconomic status and longevity. In an early study, Kitagawa and Hauser (1973)
find that low socioeconomic status is correlated with higher mortality. Deaton and Paxson
(2001) use data from the Current Population Survey and the National Longitudinal Mor-
tality Study to examine the links between mortality and income, income inequality, and
education. They show that both income and education are protective against mortality.
Several studies find similar results. Lin et al. (2003) show that life expectancy is positively
associated with income, education, martial status, and employment. Attanasio and Emmer-
son (2003) show that wealth is an important determinant of mortality, even after controlling
for initial health. Pijoan-Mas and Ríos-Rull (2014) find that education, wealth, and income
are health-protective, but have otherwise little implications for two-year mortality rates
conditional on health. In a recent study, Chetty et al. (2016) use data from the Social Secu-
rity Administration to study the relationship between income and longevity in the United
States between 2001 and 2014. They find a large positive relationship between income
and life expectancy, although the magnitude of the relationship differs across geographical
areas. Moreover, they show that differences in life expectancy by income have increased
over time. Lastly, Milligan and Schirle (2018) use administrative data from Canada for the
period 1966 to 2015 to examine how life expectancy differences by income have evolved
over time. In contrast to the United States, they find that differences in life expectancy
by income have remained roughly constant in Canada. All of these papers study how life
expectancy varies with socioeconomic status. They do not, however, study how policies
12
can be designed to reduce life expectancy inequality, which is the objective of this chapter.
Next, the chapter builds on a growing literature that incorporates health or medical ex-
penditure risk in structural life cycle models. Hubbard et al. (1994), Palumbo (1999), De
Nardi et al. (2010), Kopecky and Koreshkova (2014), and Nakajima and Telyukova (2018)
use structural life cycle models to examine how medical expenditure risk affect savings of
the elderly. De Nardi et al. (1999) and Attanasio et al. (2010) develop general equilib-
rium overlapping generations models to study the effects of aging. De Nardi et al. (2016)
study the distribution of Medicaid transfers and Medicaid valuations across single retirees,
and Braun et al. (2017) examine the welfare effects of means-tested social insurance pro-
grams such as Medicaid and Supplemental Social Insurance. Similarly, Paschenko and
Porapakkarm (2013) and Conesa et al. (2018) develop models to examine the macroeco-
nomic and welfare effects of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) and
Medicare, respectively.
All the papers mentioned above assume that health or medical expenditure risk evolves
exogenously over the life cycle. I contribute to a subset of this literature that endogenizes
the evolution of health. Hall and Jones (2007) and Fonseca et al. (2013) use a model where
the evolution of health depends on medical spending to study the determinants of increas-
ing health care costs and increasing life expectancy. Similarly, Scholz and Seshadri (2016)
study how Medicare affects mortality risk in a model where health depends on medical
spending and time investments. Such time investments can be thought of as a subset of
healthy consumption. I extend their mechanism by also focusing on unhealthy consump-
tion such as unhealthy eating and smoking. Jung and Tran (2016) study the welfare and
macroeconomic effects of the ACA within a model where agents’ health depends on med-
ical spending. In a related paper, Cole et al. (2018) develop a life cycle model where the
evolution of health is endogenously determined by the agents’ effort choice, and use the
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model to study the tradeoff between the provision of social insurance and the incentives to
maintain good health. In both of these papers, health is assumed to affect medical expen-
diture risk and labor productivity, but not longevity. Consequently, these papers are unable
to examine how policy reforms such as an expansion of health insurance coverage would
affect both life expectancy and life expectancy inequality.
Within the endogenous health literature, the two most closely related papers to mine
are Ozkan (2014) and Kotera (2018). Both papers study the determinants of the health
disparities by income in the United States. Ozkan (2014) develops a model with two types
of health capital: preventive and curative. In his model, investments in preventive capital
govern the distribution of shocks to physical capital, which in turn governs the agent’s
survival probabilities. Kotera (2018), on the other hand, develops a model where health
depends on both medical spending and smoking. In his model, agents tradeoff the utility
gains from smoking with its negative health implications.
This chapter complements these papers along several dimensions. First, this chapter dif-
fers in the way it models the evolution of health. Whereas Ozkan (2014) and Kotera (2014)
focus on preventive health care spending and smoking, respectively, This chapter focuses
on consumption of healthy and unhealthy consumption goods. This is motivated by a large
literature in medicine that studies the health consequences of healthy and unhealthy eating
and by the large variations in diet quality across income and educational groups. Second, it
differs in the way it measures health, both in the model and in the data. I use data from the
MEPS to construct an objective health measure called a frailty index. In the model, agents’
health coincides exactly with this measure. This allows me to estimate the implications
of health for survival probabilities, medical expenditure risk, and labor market outcomes
directly from the data. In contrast, Ozkan (2014) and Kotera (2018) calibrate these effects
since health stocks are unobserved in the data. Third, unlike these papers, this chapter ex-
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amine how differences in both educational attainment and income affects life expectancy
inequality, and find that both factors are key determinants of life expectancy inequality.
Lastly, it differs in the policy reforms it studies. Whereas all three studies examine health
insurance reforms, this chapter also studies the implications of several income tax reforms
for life expectancy inequality, the macroeconomy, and welfare.
Lastly, the focus on objective health measures rather than the more commonly used sub-
jective or self-rated health measures is related to ongoing work by Hosseini et al. (2018).
They develop a life cycle model where agents’ health is measured by their frailty index, and
use the model to study how differences in health outcomes affect lifetime earnings. It also
relates to recent work by De Nardi et al. (2017), who show that the dynamics of health in
the data are not consistent with the low-order Markov processes typically used in structural
life cycle models. They develop a life cycle model with a richer health process that allows
for both history-dependence and fixed ex-ante heterogeneity, and use the model to quantify
the lifetime costs of bad health. These papers, however, do not endogenize the evolution of
health, and are therefore unable to examine how policies affect longevity.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
used in this chapter, including how I construct the frailty index and how frailty affects
mortality risk, medical expenditure risk, and labor market outcomes. Section 3 lays out the
environment of the economy and sets up a quantitative life cycle model. This section also
presents the different types of health insurance that are available in the economy. Section
4 describes how I calibrate the model, and examines how well the model matches both
targeted and non-targeted moments of the data. Section 5 studies how policies can be
designed to reduce life expectancy inequality and studies the consequences of these policies
for welfare and the macroeconomy. I focus on a universal health insurance reform, two
Medicaid reforms, and three income tax reforms. Lastly, section 6 concludes and gives
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directions for future research. Additional details about the data, the regressions, and the
mechanism are given in the appendix. The appendix also examines how income inequality
and differences in educational attainment affect life expectancy inequality.
2.2 Data
This section describes the data used in this chapter. Most of the data is obtained from the
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). This longitudinal survey, which consists of
two-year overlapping panels for the period 1996 to 2016, collects detailed annual records
on health indicators, medical spending, insurance, income, and demographics for families
and individuals across the United States. The participants in the survey are drawn from
a nationally representative subsample of households that participated in the prior year’s
National Health Interview Survey conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics.
I start by explaining how I construct the frailty index, which is an objective measure
of health commonly used in the medical literature. The medical literature has largely fo-
cused on how frailty affects the probability of death and institutionalization, and how an
increase in frailty affects future health transitions. My chapter extends this literature by
documenting how frailty affects economic outcomes such as labor productivity and labor
force participation, and show how frailty covaries with socioeconomic characteristics such
as income and wealth.
2.2.1 Frailty index
I approximate an individual’s health by her frailty index. Following the literature in geron-
tology (see for example Searle et al. 2008), I let an individual’s frailty index be given
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by the sum of her health deficits. Health deficits are defined as disabilities and diseases,
some examples of which include functional limitations, cognitive impairments, and health
conditions such as cancer and diabetes. A list of all the variables used to create the frailty
index is given in appendix Table A.1. I follow conventions in the gerontology literature to
create this index. First, all binary variables such as whether or not the person has a cancer
diagnosis are assigned a value of ’0’ if the person does not have this health deficit and a
value of ’1’ if the person does have this health deficit. Second, all variables that include
more than two responses are assigned values from 0 to 1 depending on the number of pos-
sible responses. To illustrate, suppose the respondent is asked to rate her health limitations
climbing stairs on the following 3-point scale: not limited, limited a little, and limited a lot.
Then a value of ’0’ is assigned if the person is not limited, ’0.5’ if the person is limited a
little, and ’1’ if the person is limited a lot. Lastly, following conventions in the gerontology
literature, I sum the variables and normalize the index from 0 to 1 by dividing the score by
the number of variables included in the frailty index.
The left panel of Figure 2.1 plots the distribution of frailty by age. Average frailty in-
creases gradually over the life cycle from 0.03 at age 20 to 0.35 at age 85. Similarly, the
dispersion, as measured by the standard deviation of frailty, also increases over the life
cycle from 0.06 to 0.19 between the ages of 20 and 85. The right panel shows how the
frailty percentiles vary with age. For each age group, I rank individuals according to their
frailty index and compute the 25th, 50th, and 75th frailty percentile. The graph shows that
frailty varies considerably in the population. To illustrate, 20-year-olds in the fourth frailty
quartile (that is, the sickest 25 percent) have a higher frailty than 50-year-olds in the first
frailty quartile (that is, the healthiest 25 percent). Hence, although the former group is 30
years younger, they still have a worse objective health score than the latter group. Similarly,
the sickest 25 percent of 60-year-olds have a worse objective health score than healthiest
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Figure 2.1: Frailty distribution by age
Notes: The left panel plots the average and the standard deviation of frailty by age. The right panel plots the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentile of frailty by age. Data source: MEPS.
25 percent of 85-year-olds, even though the former group is 25 years younger than the lat-
ter. As will be shown in the following subsections, these differences in frailty have large
implications for mortality risk, medical expenditure risk, and labor market outcomes.
It is well known that health and income are positively correlated. To study the strength of
this relationship, I first rank individuals in a given age group by their income and compute
the 25th, 50th, and 75th income percentile. Next, I compute average frailty within each age
and income group. This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 2.2. The graph confirms
that frailty and income are negatively correlated. Across all age groups, low-income indi-
viduals are consistently more frail than high-income individuals. Moreover, the difference
in frailty between low and high-income individuals gradually increases over the course of
the working-life. As a result, I find that 50-year-olds in the bottom income quartile are
as frail as 65-year-olds in the top income quartile. It is also well known that health and
educational attainment are positively correlated. The right panel of Figure 2.2 studies the
strength of this relationship by plotting average frailty by age and educational attainment.
Here, college refers to individuals with at least a four-year college degree. All other indi-
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Figure 2.2: Average frailty by age, income quartiles, and educational attainment
Notes: The left panel plots average frailty by age and income quartile. The right panel plots average frailty
by age and educational attainment. College refers to individuals with at least a 4-year college degree. Non-
college refers to everyone else. Data source: MEPS.
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Figure 2.3: Average frailty by age and educational attainment for the bottom and top in-
come quartiles
Notes: The left panel plots average frailty by age and educational attainment for individuals in the bottom
income quartile. The right panel plots average frailty by age and educational attainment for individuals in the
top income quartile. College refers to individuals with at least a 4-year college degree. Non-college refers to
everyone else. Data source: MEPS.
viduals are classified as non-college. Across all age groups, I find that college educated
individuals are consistently less frail than non-college educated individuals.
Since income and education are correlated, it is possible that the relationship between
frailty and income documented above simply captures the relationship between frailty and
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education. To examine this, I split individuals by both their education and income. The
left panel of Figure 2.3 plots average frailty by age and educational attainment for indi-
viduals in the bottom income quartile. The graph shows that, conditional on being in the
bottom income quartile, college educated individuals are less frail than the non-college ed-
ucated. The right panel of Figure 2.3 plots the same relationships for individuals in the top
income quartile. I find that, conditional on being in the top income quartile, college and
non-college educated individuals are almost equally frail on average. These observations
show that frailty and education are correlated, but that the magnitude of the relationship
is larger among low-income individuals. The relationship between income, educational
attainment, and frailty is further examined in the appendix. I show in appendix Table A.3
that both income and education are predictive of individuals’ next-period frailty, even af-
ter controlling for initial frailty, medical spending, county of residence, occupation, and a
range of demographic variables that have been shown to covary with health such as marital
status, sex, and gender.
Lastly, I examine how frailty covaries with wealth. Since the MEPS does not report
wealth data, I use data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which provides de-
tailed longitudinal data on health, medical spending, income, wealth, and demographics for
a sample of households whose head is at least 50 years of age. To maintain consistency with
the MEPS, I construct individuals’ frailty index in the HRS using the same approach as dis-
cussed above. A list of all the variables used to create individuals’ frailty index in the HRS
is given in appendix Table A.2. Next, for each age group, I rank individuals according to
their frailty index and compute the 25th, 50th, and 75th frailty percentile. Lastly, I compute
average and median net wealth by age and frailty quartile, where net wealth is given by the
total value of housing and real estate, autos, money market accounts, savings accounts, T-
bills, IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, farm or business assets, mutual funds, bonds, and other assets,
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Figure 2.4: Average and median net wealth by age and frailty quartiles
Notes: The left panel plots average net wealth by age and frailty quartiles. The right panel plots median net
wealth by age and frailty quartiles. Net wealth is given by the total value of housing and real estate, autos,
money market accounts, savings accounts, T-bills, IRAs, Keoghs, stocks, farm or business assets, mutual
funds, bonds, and other assets, net of mortgages and other debts. Numbers are in thousands of 2009 USD.
Data source: HRS.
net of mortgages and other debts. These results are illustrated in the left and right panels of
Figure 2.4. I find that, across all age groups, wealth-rich individuals are consistently less
frail than wealth-poor individuals. Moreover, the difference in wealth is economically sig-
nificant. As an example, the right panel of Figure 2.4 shows that the healthiest 25 percent
of 65-year-olds have 4 times higher median net wealth than the sickest 25 percent.
So far, I have shown that frailty increases over the life cycle, that there exists consid-
erable heterogeneity in frailty in the population, and that, across all age groups, educated
individuals are less frail than non-educated individuals, low-income individuals are more
frail than high-income individuals, and wealth-rich individuals are less frail than wealth-
poor individuals. In what follows, I study the implications of these disparities in frailty for
mortality risk, medical spending risk, and labor market outcomes.
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Figure 2.5: Mortality probability by age and frailty quartiles
Notes: The graph plots predicted mortality probabilities by age and frailty quartiles. Probabilities are derived
from a logistic regression of mortality on age, frailty, high-order moments of age, and demographic controls.
Data source: MEPS.
Relationship between frailty and survival I start by examining how frailty affects mor-
tality risk. Using my MEPS sample, I first estimate a logistic regression of mortality on age,
frailty, higher-order moments of age, and demographic controls. Age and frailty-specific
survival probabilities can then be computed by applying the standard logistic formula. To
illustrate how frailty affects mortality risk, I compute age-specific mortality probabilities by
frailty quartiles. In particular, for each age group, I split the individuals in the MEPS into
four frailty quartiles and compute the average frailty for individuals in each group. The
derived mortality estimates are illustrated in Figure 2.5. I find that an increase in frailty
leads to a large increase in mortality risk. To illustrate, I find that the sickest 25 percent of
85-year-olds have a 3 times higher mortality probability than the healthiest 25 percent.
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Table 2.1: Medical spending by age groups and frailty percentiles
Quartiles Top
Age group 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 90-95 95-100
20-64 1,200 1,900 3,400 9,600 11,000 18,300
65+ 3,400 5,800 9,200 17,200 18,200 25,200
Notes: The table reports total average annual medical spending by age group and
frailty percentiles. Total medical spending includes all costs covered by private
insurance, public insurance, and out-of-pocket, but does not include spending on
health insurance premia. Numbers are in constant 2009 dollars. Data source:
MEPS.
Relationship between frailty and medical spending Next, I examine how frailty af-
fects medical spending. Table 2.1 reports total average medical spending by age groups and
frailty percentiles in the MEPS. Note that total medical spending includes all costs covered
by private insurance, public insurance, and out-of-pocket, but does not include spending
on health insurance premia. All current prices have been converted to 2009 dollars using
personal consumption expenditure health (PCE-Health) price indices. I find that an in-
crease in frailty leads to a large increase in medical expenditure risk. In particular, I find
that average annual medical spending for 20-64 year-olds is about $1,200 for individuals
in the first frailty quartile. In contrast, 20-64 year-olds in the fourth frailty quartile spend
an average of $9,600 on health care per year. The last two columns report average annual
medical spending for individuals at the top of the frailty distribution. As reported in the
table, the sickest 5 percent of 20-64 year-olds spend almost $20,000 per year on health
care. Similarly, I find that health care spending is increasing in frailty for the elderly. To
illustrate, the healthiest and sickest 25 percent of 65+ year-olds spend an average of $3,400
and $17,200 on health care per year, respectively, with the sickest 5 percent spending an
average of more than $25,000 per year.
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Relationship between frailty and labor earnings Lastly, I examine how frailty affects
labor market outcomes. Recall that the MEPS consists of two-year overlapping panels.
Using this admittedly short panel dimension, I first estimate how frailty affects labor pro-
ductivity by regressing the logarithm of hourly wages in year two on initial hourly wages,
frailty, education, a quadratic in age, and demographic controls. I restrict the sample to 20-
64 year-olds that work at least 10 hours per week. The estimates are reported in appendix
Table A.5. The regression results show that the semi-elasticity of hourly wages with respect
to frailty is −0.16. This finding suggests that frailty has a relatively modest effect on labor
earnings since average frailty only increases by about 0.2 over the course of the working
life. Such a conclusion, however, would understate the full effect of frailty on labor earn-
ings. First, as reported in appendix Table A.6, I find that frailty has negative implications
for hours worked conditional on working at least 10 hours per week. Second, and more im-
portantly, I find that frailty has negative implications for labor force participation. Across
all age groups, less frail individuals are more likely to participate in the labor force than
more frail individuals. This can be seen in Figure 2.6, which plots labor force participation
rates by age and frailty quartiles. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is economically
significant. As an example, I find that the sickest 25 percent of 50-year-olds have a 34
percentage point lower labor force participation rate than the healthiest 25 percent. This
implies that frailty can have large implications for retirement decisions. In particular, be-
cause of the high persistence of frailty, more frail individuals are likely to opt for early
retirement than less frail individuals. As a result, more frail individuals are not only likely
to earn less and accumulate less wealth over the course of their working-life, they are also
likely to claim lower Social Security benefits during retirement since the current Social
Security system ties benefits to past contributions.
In what follows, I will develop a structural life cycle model with incomplete markets,
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Figure 2.6: Labor force participation rate by age and frailty quartiles
Notes: The graph plots labor force participation rates by age and frailty quartiles. Data source: MEPS.
heterogeneous agents, and endogenous health that can account for the facts documented
in this section. In particular, it can account for the considerable heterogeneity in frailty in
the population, the implications of frailty for mortality risk, medical expenditure risk, and
labor market outcomes, and the relationship between frailty and income, education, and
wealth.
2.3 Model
This section develops a structural life cycle model that can account for the observations
documented in the preceding section. The model is a discrete time general equilibrium life
cycle model with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents, and endogenous health.
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2.3.1 Agents
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante heterogeneous agents. Agents are
indexed by type s = ( j, f ,a,ξ ,η , i,e), where j denotes age, f is frailty, a is assets, ξ de-
notes medical expenditures, η is labor productivity, i is the agent’s private health insurance
status, and e is educational attainment. The agent’s educational attainment is assumed to
be permanent over her life cycle and can take on one of two values: college or non-college.
Throughout, I let Φ(s) denote the measure of agents of type s in the stationary distribution.
Agents are endowed with one unit of time that can be allocated to work, `, or leisure.
They choose consumption of healthy goods, ch, and unhealthy goods, cu, and how much
to save, a′. Lastly, they choose whether or not to purchase private health insurance for the
following period, i′. Starting at age jr, all agents receive Social Security benefits that vary
with their educational attainment, SS (e), and health insurance from the government in the
form of Medicare. Consistent with the data, agents are subject to mortality risk that varies
with their age and frailty, ψ ( f , j). Agents that survive until age J are assumed to die with
probability one. In the event of death, the agent’s assets are uniformly distributed across
the population by means of lump-sum transfers, B.
The law of motion for frailty is endogenous and depends on the agent’s current age,
frailty, education, and consumption basket. In particular, agents can affect their frailty
transition probabilities, which follow finite-state Markov processes, through consumption
of healthy goods:
P
(
f ′| f , j,e,ch
)
= Prob
(
f ′ ∈ F : ( f , j, e, ch)
)
. (1)
This mechanism that frailty depends on the healthiness of the agent’s consumption basket is
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motivated by a large literature in medicine that studies the health consequences of healthy
and unhealthy eating. To illustrate, Danaei et al. (2009), Lim et al. (2012), and Murray
et al. (2013) show that poor diets, especially diets low in fruits and those high in sodium,
are among the leading causes of cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, diet-related cancers,
and obesity. The assumption that frailty transitions depend on age and education enables
me to capture both the observation that average frailty increases over the life cycle and
the observation that, across all age groups, educated individuals are less frail than non-
educated individuals. Disparities in frailty by educational attainment are partially driven
by differences in smoking rates. In particular, data from the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention show that about 7 and 23 percent of educated and non-educated adults currently
smoke in the United States, respectively. Therefore, letting frailty transitions vary with
educational attainment enables me to indirectly account for smoking in the model, albeit in
a reduced form way.
Next, building on the positive relationship between frailty and medical spending docu-
mented in Table 2.1, I assume that medical expenditure risk is increasing in frailty. In par-
ticular, I assume that the transition probabilities for medical expenses follow a finite-state
Markov process that depends on the agent’s current medical expenses, age, and frailty:
P
(
ξ ′| f , j,ξ)= Prob(ξ ′ ∈ X : ( f , j,ξ )) . (2)
Similarly, labor productivity is given by a stationary finite-state Markov process:
P
(
η ′|η)= Prob(η ′ ∈ E : η) . (3)
I assume that healthy and unhealthy goods are perfect substitutes, but that unhealthy
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goods have a lower relative price, p. This is motivated by evidence from the medical lit-
erature that studies the relationship between energy density and energy cost. To illustrate,
Drewnowski and Specter (2004) show that healthier foods such as fruits and vegetables
tend to have a higher price per calorie than less healthy foods such as sweets and processed
meats. Similar results are reported by Drewnowski (2010), who studies the relationship
between energy density and energy cost for about 1400 different foods. Additional details
are given in the appendix.
Building on Hall and Jones (2007), I let the utility function be given by
u(ch,cu, f , `) = b+
(
(ch+ cu)
γ (1− `−µ ( f , j))1−γ
)1−σ
1−σ , (4)
where σ governs the relative risk aversion and γ governs the consumption share in in-
tratemporal utility. The constant term in the utility function, b, governs the value of life in
the model. Assuming σ > 1, a positive value of b is needed to ensure positive flow utility
in the model. Note that these preferences imply that the marginal utility of consumption
falls with consumption. As emphasized by Hall and Jones (2007), extending life does not
run into the same kind of diminishing returns. High-income agents can thus avoid the di-
minishing returns to consumption by instead focusing on choices that extend their lifespan,
thereby further increasing their lifetime utility. Consistent with this, Rehm et al. (2016)
show that high-income individuals have a healthier diet than low-income individuals. In
particular, using data from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey, they
show that more than 60 percent of low-income individuals have a diet that is classified
as poor by the American Heart Association because of its negative implications for vari-
ous health outcomes such as cardiovascular diseases. In contrast, less than 30 percent of
middle-income individuals have a diet that is classified as poor. Lastly, the disutility cost of
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working, µ ( f , j) , is assumed to be increasing in frailty to capture the negative relationship
between frailty and labor force participation illustrated in Figure 2.6. It is also increasing
in age to capture the drop in labor force participation at age 65. This is further discussed in
Section 2.4.5.
2.3.2 Technology
Firms hire labor at wage w and rent capital at rate r from the agents to maximize profits.
I assume that the aggregate technology can be represented by a constant returns to scale
Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = θKαN1−α , (5)
where θ denotes total factor productivity, K is the aggregate capital stock, N denotes ag-
gregate labor supply measured in efficiency units, and α is capital’s share of income.
Output is used for consumption of healthy goods, Ch, unhealthy goods, Cu, investment,
I = K′− (1−δ )K, government consumption, G, and to cover medical expenses, M:
Ch+ pCu+G+M+K′ = θKαN1−α +(1−δ )K, (6)
where δ is the rate of depreciation.1
1For simplicity, instead of having two sectors in the economy, I assume that agents have access to a technology
that transforms healthy to unhealthy goods at a fixed price, p. Since healthy and unhealthy goods are assumed
to be perfect substitutes, but healthy consumption goods also facilitate better frailty transitions, unhealthy
goods must be less expensive than healthy goods (that is, p< 1) to avoid a corner solution where all agents
only consume healthy goods.
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2.3.3 Health insurance
This section presents the different types of health insurance that are available in the econ-
omy. Health insurance is available in the form of private health insurance, employer pro-
vided health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. The agent’s insurance status determines
what fraction of her medical expenses must be paid out-of-pocket. Throughout, I let χP, χE ,
χCARE , and χCAID denote the copayment parameter for private health insurance, employer
insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid, respectively.
Private health insurance Agents can purchase health insurance for the following pe-
riod on the individual health insurance (IHI) market. I assume that insurance companies in
the IHI market are allowed to price discriminate based on frailty, age, and current medical
spending. That is, insurance pools are given by the triplet ( f , j,ξ ). Moreover, for computa-
tional simplicity, I assume that insurance premia are actuarially fair for each insurance pool.
Lastly, I assume that Medicare is the primary payer for all agents aged jr and older in the
model. Hence, in the event that an agent has both Medicare and private health insurance,
Medicare pays first. Insurance premia, pi ( f , j,ξ ), are then given by
pi ( f , j,ξ ) =

ψ( f , j)(1−χP)
∫
ξ ′P(ξ ′| f , j,ξ )
(1+r′) if j < jr−1
ψ( f , j)(1−χP)χCARE
∫
ξ ′P(ξ ′| f , j,ξ )
(1+r′) if j ≥ jr−1,
(7)
where the second line follows from the assumption that Medicare is the primary payer for
all the elderly.
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Employer sponsored insurance I follow Conesa et al. (2018) and assume that a fraction
of workers work for an employer that provides health insurance. The employer pools the
medical expenses of all its employees and then splits these costs evenly between the work-
ers. This gives the following expression for the employer-provided insurance premium:
piE =
(1−χE)
∫
ξΦ(ds|i= iE)∫
Φ(ds|i= iE) , (8)
where by Φ(ds|i= iE) = Φ(d j×dh×da×dξ ×dη×{iE}) it is understood that the in-
tegral is over all types s but restricted to agents with employer-provided health insurance,
i = iE . Following Conesa et al. (2018), I assume that agents cannot have both employer-
provided and private health insurance, and that agents cannot opt out of employer-provided
insurance.
Medicare and Medicaid The government runs two health insurance programs: Medicare
and Medicaid. As noted earlier, Medicare covers a share 1− χCARE of health expenses of
all agents aged jr and older. Medicaid, on the other hand, is a means-tested program that
provides health insurance to the poor. Consistent with program rules, I model two ways to
qualify for Medicaid. First, agents are eligible for Medicaid if the sum of their gross income
and interest earnings is below a threshold yCAT . Second, agents also qualify for Medicaid if
the sum of their gross income and interest earnings net of out-of-pocket medical expenses
is below a threshold yMN . I refer to the two eligibility criteria as categorical eligibility and
eligibility based on medical need, respectively.
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2.3.4 Government
The government engages in three activities in the model. First, as already noted, it provides
public health insurance in the form of Medicare and Medicaid. Second, it runs a Social
Security program that provides public pensions for the elderly. In reality, Social Security
payments are tied to an individual’s earnings history. To account for this, I would have had
to add individual earnings histories as an additional continuous state in the model. There-
fore, for computational simplicity, I assume that benefits are independent of individual
earnings histories. This means that the Social Security program will be more progressive
in the model than it is in the United States. To partially correct for this, I let benefits vary
with educational attainment, which is correlated with lifetime earnings both in the model
and in the data. Let d (e) denote the Social Security replacement rate conditional on edu-
cational attainment. Building on Conesa and Krueger (2006), I let Social Security benefits
be given by
SS (e) =
d (e)wN∫
Φ(ds| j < jr) , (9)
where byΦ(ds| j < jr)=Φ({1, . . . , jr−1}×dh×da×dξ ×dη×di) it is understood that
the integral is over all types s but restricted to agents of age j ≤ jr−1. Finally, the govern-
ment runs a welfare program that guarantees minimum consumption. To qualify for this
program in the model, agents have to forfeit all assets and earnings. In return, the govern-
ment pays for all out-of-pocket medical expenses and guarantees a minimum consumption
level, c.
The government finances its expenditures by means of two taxes: a consumption tax,
τc, and progressive income taxes, T (y). Following Gouveia and Strauss (1994), I let the
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income tax schedule be given by
T (y) = a0
(
y− (y−a1 +a2)− 1a1 ) , (10)
where y denotes income and (a0,a1,a2) are parameters that determine the shape of the tax
function. Here, a0 determines the maximum marginal and average tax rate as limy→∞ (T (y)/y)=
limy→∞T ′ (y) = a0. The second parameter, a1, governs the progressivity of the tax function.
To illustrate, for a1 =−1 we obtain a constant tax independent of income, T (y) =−a0a2,
for a1→ 0 we obtain a proportional tax function, T (y) = α0y, and for a1 > 0 we obtain a
progressive tax system where average and marginal tax rates are increasing with income.
Lastly, the third parameter, a2, affects the average income tax rate in the economy.
Let GH denote total government spending on health care and welfare, and let G denote
government consumption. For simplicity, I assume that government consumption is exoge-
nous. Its only purpose is to equalize the size of the government sector in the model and the
data, thereby ensuring that the tax burden in the model is consistent with the data. Through-
out, I assume that the government balances its budget period-by-period. I then obtain the
following expression for the government budget constraint:
G+GH+
∫
SS (e)Φ(ds| j ≥ jr) = τc (Ch+ pCu)+
∫
T (y)Φ(ds) , (11)
where byΦ(ds| j ≥ jr)=Φ({ jr, . . . ,J}×dh×da×dξ ×dη×di) it is understood that the
integral is over all types s but restricted to agents of age j ≥ jr.
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2.3.5 Agent problem
The agent’s choice set depends on her age. Throughout, I use the word young to denote
agents less than age jr and old to denote agents that are at least jr years old.
Recall that an agent’s type is given s= ( j, f ,a,ξ ,η , i,e), where j denotes age, f is frailty,
a is assets, ξ denotes medical expenditures, η is labor productivity, i is the agent’s private
health insurance status, and e is educational attainment. Let V I (s) denote the value of
young agents that do not work for an employer that provides health insurance. The value
function is given by:
V I (s) = max
ch,cu,`,a′,i′
u(ch,cu, f , `)+βψ ( f , j)∑η ′∑ξ ′∑ f ′ P(η ′|η)P(ξ ′|ξ , f , j)P( f ′| f , j,e,ch)V (s′)
s.t. c+ pch+a′+m(ξ , i)+ Ii′=iPpi ( f , j,ξ ) = wηε ( f , j,e)`+(1+ r)(a+B)
−T (y)+TR(s)+ IMed (s)(1−χCAID)m(ξ , i)
y= wηε ( f , j,e)`+ r (a+B)
m(ξ , i) = Ii=iPχPξ +(1− Ii=iP)ξ
i′ ∈ {iS, iP}
ch,cu, `,a′ ≥ 0.
(12)
i = iP means the agent has private health insurance and i = iS means the agent is self-
insured. The indicator function, IMed(s, `), equals one if the agent qualifies for Medicaid.
Medicaid covers a share 1− χCAID of out-of-pocket medical expenses, m(ξ , i), which is
given by ξ for self-insured agents and χPξ for agents with that purchased private health
insurance in the preceding period. TR(s) denotes transfers to agents whose resources net of
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medical expenditures are less than c. Lastly, labor earnings depend on the agent’s stochastic
labor productivity, η , and deterministic life cycle productivity, ε ( f , j,e), the last of which
varies with the agent’s age, frailty, and education.
Similarly, let VE (s) denote the value of young agents that work for an employer that
provides health insurance. The value function is given by:
VE (s) = max
ch,cu,`,a′
u(ch,cu, f , `)+βψ ( f , j)∑η ′∑ξ ′∑ f ′ P(η ′|η)P(ξ ′|ξ , f , j)P( f ′| f , j,e,ch)V (s′)
s.t. ch+ pcu+a′+m(ξ , i)+piE = wηε ( f , j,e)`+(1+ r)(a+B)
−T (y)+TR(s)+ IMed (s)(1−χCAID)m(ξ , i)
y= wηε ( f , j,e)`+ r (a+B)
m(ξ , i) = χEξ
i′ = iE
ch,cu, `,a′ ≥ 0.
(13)
All agents with employer-provided insurance pays a health insurance premium piE that is
used to cover a fraction 1−χE of the workers’ health care expenses.
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Lastly, let VO (s) denote the value of old agents, which is given by
VO (s) = max
ch,cu,`,a′,i′
u(ch,cu, f , `)+βψ ( f , j)∑η ′∑ξ ′∑ f ′ P(η ′|η)P(ξ ′|ξ , f , j)P( f ′| f , j,e,ch)V (s′)
s.t. ch+ pcu+a′+m(ξ , i)+ Ii′=iPpi ( f , j,ξ ) = SS (e)+wηε ( f , j,e)`+(1+ r)(a+B)
−T (y)+TR(s)+ IMed (s)(1−χCAID)m(ξ , i)
y= SS (e)+wηε ( f , j,e)`+ r (a+B)
m(ξ , i) = Ii=iPχPχCAREξ +(1− Ii=iP)χCAREξ
i′ ∈ {iS, iP, iE}
ch,cu, `,a′ ≥ 0.
(14)
All agents start receiving Medicare and Social Security benefits at age jr. Neither program
is tied to retirement, and hence agents continue to receive both Medicare and Social Secu-
rity benefits even if they choose to work in old age. Out-of-pocket medical expenses are
given by χCAREξ for agents that did not purchase private health insurance in the preceding
period and χCAREχPξ for agents with private health insurance.
2.3.6 Definition of equilibrium
Given Social Security replacement rates d (e) , copayment parameters χP, χCARE, and χCAID,
and initial conditions for capital K1 and the measure of types Φ1, an equilibrium in this
model is a sequence of model variables such that:
1. Given prices, insurance premia, government policies, and accidental bequests, agents
maximize utility subject to their constraints.
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2. Factor prices satisfy marginal product pricing conditions.
3. Government policies satisfy the government budget constraint.
4. Goods, factor, and insurance market clearing conditions are met.
5. Aggregate law of motion for Φ is induced by the policy functions and the stochastic
processes for idiosyncratic risk.
2.4 Calibration
This section describes how I map the model to the data. I start by discussing how I calibrate
the preference and technology parameters, and how I compute health insurance coinsurance
rates and Medicaid income limits. Next, I explain how I derive the frailty transition proba-
bilities, the survival probabilities, and the medical expenditure probabilities. The following
two subsections explain how I estimate the deterministic labor productivity profiles, how I
calibrate both the stochastic labor productivity process and the disincentive effects of work,
and how I parameterize the income tax schedule. Lastly, the final subsection compares how
well the model matches both targeted and non-targeted moments.
2.4.1 Preference, technology, and health insurance parameters
Agents enter the model at age 20 and have a maximum life span of 100 years. Each model
period corresponds to one year. The retirement age, jr, is set to 46 such that agents start
receiving Medicare and Social Security benefits at age 65. I set the annual population
growth rate to 1.1 percent to match recent US population growth rates as reported by the
Census. Following Castañeda et al. (2003), I set the depreciation rate, δ , to 0.059, and
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capital’s share of income, α, to 0.360. The coefficient of risk aversion, σ , is set to 3, which
is within the range of 2 to 4 commonly used in structural life cycle models. Lastly, I set the
consumption share in intratemporal utility, γ, to 0.574 to match estimates in French (2005).
Following Conesa et al. (2018), I let the coinsurance rate on each insurance plan be
given by the average share of expenses covered across individuals in the MEPS with that
insurance plan as their primary insurance provider, where the primary insurance provider is
defined as the insurer that pays for the largest share of the individual’s expenses. This gives
a coinsurance rate on private insurance and employer provided insurance of 22.9 percent,
and a coinsurance rate on Medicare and Medicaid of 29.1 and 13.8 percent, respectively.
Next, using estimates by the Kaiser Family Foundation, I set the Medicaid categorical
income limit, yCAT , equal to 90.2 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), which was
about $11,700 in 2014, and set the Medicaid medically needy income limit, yMN , equal
to 41.9 percent of the FPL. A summary of the parameters determined outside the model is
given in Table 2.2.
The final set of parameters is determined jointly in equilibrium. I normalize the total
factor productivity parameter, θ , such that GDP per capita equals one in the benchmark
model. I calibrate the discount factor, β , to match a capital to GDP ratio of 3.3. I calibrate
the Social Security replacement rates, d (e), to match average Social Security benefits by
educational attainment. The constant term in the utility function, b, determines the value of
life in the model. This parameter affects how much agents are willing to invest in healthy
consumption. I calibrate this parameter to match average frailty at age 60. This gives a
value of 6.5 for b, which is close to the value of 6.75 estimated by Ozkan (2014). Recall
from equation (4) that healthy and unhealthy goods are assumed to be perfect substitutes,
but that unhealthy goods have a lower relative price, p. This relative price governs the
tradeoff between higher current period consumption and lower next-period expected frailty.
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Table 2.2: Parameters determined outside the model
Parameter Description Source Value
Preference and technology parameters
J Maximum life span 81
jr Agents receive SS and Medicare 46
α Capital share of income Castañeda et al. (2003) 0.360
δ Depreciation rate Castañeda et al. (2003) 0.059
γ Consumption share in utility French (2005) 0.574
σ Risk aversion 3.000
Population growth rate 0.011
Percent of agents with college degree 0.320
Health insurance coinsurance rates
χP Private insurance coinsurance rate MEPS 0.229
χE Employer insurance coinsurance rate MEPS 0.229
χCARE Medicare coinsurance rate MEPS 0.291
χCAID Medicaid coinsurance rate MEPS 0.138
Medicaid income limits
yCAT Medicaid categorical income limit Kaiser Family Foundation 0.197
yMN Medicaid medically needy income limit Kaiser Family Foundation 0.092
Notes: The table lists the parameters that are determined outside the model.
I therefore calibrate this relative price to match life expectancy inequality by income, here
defined as the difference in life expectancy at age 40 by income quartile. Lastly, I set
the guaranteed consumption level, c, equal to 0.070, which corresponds to a minimum
consumption level of about $3,500 in 2014. This is close to the value used by De Nardi et
al. (2017) and lies within the $1,000 to $7,000 range commonly used in the literature. A
summary of the parameters determined outside the model is given in Table 2.3.
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Table 2.3: Parameters determined jointly in equilibrium
Parameter Description Target Value
Preference and technology parameters
θ Total factor productivity GDP per capita = 1 0.647
β Discount factor Capital to output = 3.3 0.955
d(c) SS college replacement rate Avg. SS benefit college ≈ 14,200 0.374
d(nc) SS non-college replacement rate Avg. SS benefit non-college ≈ 11,900 0.313
b Constant term in utility function Average frailty at 60 6.504
p Relative price unhealthy goods Life expectancy diff. by income quartile at 40 0.923
c Guaranteed consumption Minimum consumption ≈ 3,500 0.070
Eligible for emp. ins. Perc. with pvt. or employer ins. = 0.508 0.484
Scale for health care costs health care spending to GDP = 0.165 1.803
Labor productivity process parameters
ση Variance Labor earnings GINI = 0.670 3.941
ηtop Productivity at the top Labor earnings top 1 percent = 0.148 25.021
pitop Probability at the top Laborn earnings top 10 percent = 0.435 0.004
ρη Persistence 2-year persistence: Bottom 80 percent = 0.940 0.911
ρtop Persistence at the top 2-year persistence: Top 1 percent = 0.580 0.792
Notes: The table lists the parameters that are determined jointly in equilibrium.
2.4.2 Frailty transition probabilities
Recall that I normalize an individual’s frailty in the data from 0 to 1. I follow the same
approach in the model.2 Next, I assume that agents draw their frailty from an ordered lo-
gistic distribution. The frailty transition probabilities are then given by the standard ordered
logistic formula:
P
(
f ′ = i|x)= 1
1+ exp(−κi+xβ ) −
1
1+ exp(−κi−1+xβ ) , (15)
where x = ( f ,e,ch), β is a vector of parameters, and the κ ′s denote cutoffs. I use the
following procedure to derive these probabilities. I start by estimating this ordered logistic
function in the data by replacing healthy consumption with income. I then use the derived
2I use a uniformly spaced grid with 25 points for the frailty grid.
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coefficient estimates as initial guesses for the coefficients of P( f ′| f , j,e,ch) in the model.
Next, I estimate the same coefficients using simulated data from the model. Lastly, I iterate
on the preference parameters and the coefficients of the ordered logistic function until the
model and data regression estimates coincide.3
2.4.3 Survival probabilities
Using my MEPS sample, I first estimate age and frailty-specific survival probabilities by
running a logistic regression of mortality on age, frailty, higher-order moments, and demo-
graphic controls. Let these probabilities be denoted by ψˆ ( f , j). Next, I compute average
frailty by age, Λ( f , j), for 20-85 year-olds in the data. I then extrapolate using an expo-
nential trend to obtain average frailty for 86-100 year-olds. This step is necessary since the
MEPS top-codes age at 85. Lastly, for each age, I scale the survival probabilities estimated
from the MEPS by a factor α ( j) to match age-specific survival probabilities in 2014 as re-
ported by the Social Security Administration, ψ ( j)SSA, where the scaling parameter solves
the following equation:
α ( j) =
ψ ( j)SSA
∑ f Λ( f , j) ψˆ ( f , j)
, ∀ j. (16)
This step is necessary since the MEPS does not sample institutionalized individuals, which
leads to upward biased survival estimates. Survival probabilities by age and frailty are then
given by ψ ( f , j) = α ( j) ψˆ ( f , j). A similar approach is used by Attanasio et al. (2010) to
derive health-specific survival probability estimates.
3The coefficients of the frailty transition matrix are calibrated jointly with the other parameters in the model
to ensure that the model matches all targeted moments.
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2.4.4 Medical expenditure transition probabilities
I use three points for the medical expenditure grid, ξ .4 To estimate transition probabilities
between these points, I split medical expenses into the following categories in the data: low,
high, and very high, where the three categories refer to individuals in the MEPS with med-
ical expenses less than $1,000, between $1,000 and $40,000, and greater than $40,000,
respectively. I assume that these expenses are drawn from an ordered logistic distribution
that depends on current medical spending, age, and frailty. Estimates of this regression are
reported in appendix Table A.4. Transition probabilities between the medical expenditure
states, P(ξ ′|ξ , f , j), are then given by the standard ordered logistic formula.
I set the three values of the medical expenditure grid, ξ ∈ {ξ1,ξ2,ξ3}, equal to the aver-
age value across individuals in the MEPS with low, high, and very high medical expendi-
tures, respectively. These values are then scaled to match the ratio of health care spending
to GDP in 2014. Again, this step is necessary since the MEPS does not sample institution-
alized individuals, which account for a large share of total medical spending in the United
States. Medical expenses derived from the MEPS must therefore be scaled up to match the
aggregate statistics reported by the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services.
2.4.5 Labor earnings
Agents in the model are endowed with one unit of time in every period that can be allocated
to work and leisure. I let µ ( f , j), which governs the disutility of work by frailty and age,
be given by µ ( f , j) = µ1 exp(µ2 f )+ I j≥ jrµ3. I calibrate µ1 and µ2 to match labor force
participation by frailty, and set µ3 to match labor force participation rates of the elderly.
4Because of the size of the state space, I restrict the size of the medical expenditure grid to reduce computa-
tional costs.
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This last part is necessary to match the large drop in labor force participation at age 65.
Although the model qualitatively matches the drop in labor force participation at age 65 due
to eligibility for Social Security and Medicare, it falls short quantitatively. An additional
disincentive effect, µ3, is thus needed to match the data.
To reduce computational costs, I use a finite grid for labor supply. In particular, I assume
that agents have the choice of working 0, 20, 40, or 60 hours per week. Having a continuous
choice for labor supply is problematic in this environment since eligibility for Medicaid
depends on current income. Infinitesimal changes in labor supply can thus lead to large
discontinuous changes in the value function. That said, this finite grid for labor supply
closely matches the observation in the MEPS that the majority of Americans work exactly
20, 40, or 60 hours per week.
I follow Castañeda et al. (2003) and let the stochastic labor productivity shocks be drawn
from a right-skewed distribution whose moments are calibrated to match the observed earn-
ings distribution in the United States. This process enriches the standard earnings process
commonly used in structural life cycle models with a very high productivity at the top,
whose level, probability, and persistence are calibrated to match the high end of the ob-
served earnings distribution. A summary of the calibrated productivity process parameters
is given at the end of Table 2.3. Lastly, recall that agents’ life cycle labor productivity pro-
files vary with age, education, and frailty, ε (e, f , j). I use the age and education-specific
labor productivity profiles estimated by Conesa et al. (2018). These profiles are illustrated
in appendix figure A1. I then combine these profiles with the estimates of the effect of
frailty on hourly wages reported in appendix Table A.5.
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2.4.6 Government
As noted in Section 2.3.4, the government finances its spending on consumption, Medicare,
Medicaid, Social Security, and welfare by means of two taxes: a consumption tax, τc, and
a progressive income tax, T (y). Following Mendoza (1994), I set τc equal to 0.0567. I
set a0 equal to 0.258 and a1 equal to 0.768 following estimates in Gouveia and Strauss
(1994), and let a2 adjust such that the government balances its budget period-by-period.
Lastly, I set (unproductive) government consumption, G, such that aggregate government
spending as a share of GDP equals 20.0 percent in the model. This value lies within the
17.8 and 21.3 percent range observed between 1989 and 2014 as reported by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
2.4.7 Model fit
This section examines how well the model matches the data. Throughout this section, data
and model results are illustrated using solid black and dotted blue lines, respectively. The
left panel of Figure 2.7 plots average frailty by age. As shown in the graph, the model is
able to match the gradual increase in average frailty over the life cycle. The model can also
account for the high concentration of frailty observed in the data. This can be seen in the
right panel of Figure 2.7, which compares the cumulative distribution function of frailty for
20 to 85-year-olds in the model and the data.
Recall that I calibrate the parameters of disutility function of work, µ ( f , j) , to match
labor force participation rate by frailty quartile and the large drop in participation rates
at age 65. To examine how well the model matches the data, Table 2.4 compares labor
force participation rate by age groups in the model and the data, where the data refers to
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Figure 2.7: Frailty distribution by age: model versus data
Notes: The left panel plots average frailty by age in the model and the data. The right panel plots the
cumulative distribution function of frailty for 20-85 year-olds in the model and the data. Data source: MEPS.
Table 2.4: Labor force participation rate by age group: model versus data
Age group
20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-69 70-74 75+
Data 0.75 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.64 0.29 0.17 0.06
Model 0.79 0.91 0.87 0.78 0.62 0.28 0.21 0.10
Notes: The table reports labor force participation rate by age group in the model and the data.
The data refers to the 2006 civilian labor force participation rates by age groups as reported by
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2006 civilian labor force participation rates by age groups reported by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. I find that the model slightly overestimates the participation rate of 20 to 44-
year-olds and the 70+ year olds, but closely matches the participation rate of the rest of the
population.
Next, I compare how well the model matches the relationship between wealth and frailty.
Recall from Section 2.2.1 that the healthiest 25 percent of 50-65 year-olds have 3.1 times
higher average net wealth than the sickest 25 percent. I find that the corresponding statistic
in the model is 2.4. This shows that the model qualitatively matches the observed wealth-
frailty gradient, but falls slightly short quantitatively.
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Table 2.5: Labor earnings distribution (percent)
Quintiles Top
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100 Gini
Data -0.40 3.19 12.49 23.33 61.39 12.38 16.37 14.76 0.63
Model 0.26 4.79 9.79 20.59 64.56 11.83 16.77 14.78 0.63
Notes: The table reports the labor earnings distribution in the model and the data. Cells denote
shares of total. Data source: Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2013).
Lastly, I examine how well the model matches the earnings and wealth distribution. As
explained in Section 2.4.5, I calibrate the labor productivity process to match the empirical
earnings distribution as documented by Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2013). A comparison of the
earnings distribution in the model and the data is given in Table 2.5. As shown in the
first part of the table, the model closely matches each quintile’s share of total earnings.
Moreover, the model also matches the share of earnings held by the top quintile of the
earnings distribution, and the overall concentration of earnings as measured by the GINI
coefficient. Table 2.6 compares the wealth distribution in the model and the data. Although
I do not calibrate the model to match the wealth distribution, the model is able to match
the share of wealth held by each of the five wealth quintiles. It also matches the share of
wealth held by the top 10 percent of the distribution, but fails to account for the very high
wealth holdings of the top 1 percent. As a result, the model’s GINI coefficient of wealth
falls short of what we observe in the data.
2.5 Results
This section studies how policies can be designed to reduce life expectancy inequality and
examines what the consequences of these policies are for welfare and the macroeconomy.
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Table 2.6: Wealth distribution (percent)
Quintiles Top
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100 Gini
Data -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55 0.78
Model 0.22 0.48 4.93 18.27 76.10 15.98 25.79 15.15 0.75
Notes: The table reports the wealth distribution in the model and the data. Cells denote shares
of total. Data source: Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2013).
Recall that there is a two-way relationship between income and frailty in the model. High
frailty leads to low income, which in turn leads to lower consumption of healthy goods
and hence higher next-period expected frailty. This two-way relationship suggests that the
government can improve population health outcomes by expanding insurance coverage or
by increasing redistribution, both of which facilitate higher investments in healthy con-
sumption in times of low net income. To test this hypothesis, I study the effects of three
policy reforms. First, I examine the effects of a universal health insurance reform. Next, I
compare the results from this reform with the results from two Medicaid reforms designed
to increase insurance coverage among low-income agents. Lastly, I study the effects of
three income tax reforms designed to alter the level of redistribution between high- and
low-income agents in the economy.5
5The appendix provides additional details about the determinants of life expectancy inequality. In particular,
I examine how income inequality and differences in educational attainment affect life expectancy inequality
by studying two counterfactual environments. First, I study a model where frailty transitions are exogenous
and hence independent of consumption. As reported in the appendix, I find that life expectancy inequality is
76 percent lower in this model than in the benchmark model. Next, I study a model where education affects
income, but not frailty transitions. This model enables me to decompose the income effect of education from
the direct health-protective effect of education. I find that life expectancy inequality is 22 percent lower in
this model than in the benchmark model. These findings suggest that both income inequality and differences
in educational attainment are key drivers of life expectancy inequality in the United States.
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2.5.1 Universal health insurance
To understand how health insurance inequality affects life expectancy inequality, I compare
the benchmark model with a counterfactual economy with universal health insurance. In
particular, I consider an economy where the government covers 86.2 percent of all health
care expenses, and finances these costs by increasing the average income tax rate in the
economy (that is, by increasing a2 in equation (11)). In effect, this means that the entire
population becomes eligible for Medicaid.
The first part of Table 2.7 shows how life expectancy varies in the two models. I find a
negative relationship between average life expectancy and health insurance inequality. In
particular, I find that eliminating health insurance inequality leads to a small increase in life
expectancy at age 20 from 78.90 to 79.00 years. Note, however, that this result is likely to
provide a lower bound on the effect of health insurance inequality on life expectancy due to
the assumption that health care spending does not improve health outcomes in the model.
Although there is limited evidence of positive health returns to medical spending, there are
papers that suggest that expanded insurance coverage can improve health outcomes. As
an example, Card et al. (2008, 2009) find evidence that utilization of health care services
increases when people become eligible for Medicare, and that this increased utilization
lowers mortality rates.
Next, I examine how the reform affects life expectancy inequality. A comparison of the
benchmark model and the model with universal health insurance shows that the richest 25
percent of 40-year-olds have the same life expectancy in the two environments. Life ex-
pectancy among agents in the first income quartile, on the other hand, increases by 0.41
years following the reform. Consequently, I find that life expectancy inequality declines
from 7.01 to 6.60 years. That is, eliminating health insurance inequality through a uni-
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Table 2.7: Comparative statics: Economy with and without universal health insurance
Variable Benchmark Universal insurance
Life expectancy (years)
Life expectancy at 20 78.90 79.00
Life expectancy difference at 40 by income quartile 7.01 6.60
Macroeconomic aggregates (% change from bench.)
GDP per capita - 0.50
Capital per capita - 0.68
Effective labor supply per capita - 0.40
health care spending per capita - -0.18
Total consumption per capita - 0.14
Government spending (percent)
Government spending to GDP 20.00 24.56
Public health care spending to GDP 9.37 13.78
Social Security spending to GDP 4.77 4.82
Inequality
GINI coefficient pre-tax earnings 0.67 0.67
GINI coefficient wealth 0.72 0.72
Notes: The table compares the benchmark model results with results from a counterfactual model with
universal health insurance where the government covers 86.2 percent of all health care costs.
versal health insurance reform leads to a 6 percent decline in life expectancy inequality.
Qualitatively similar results are obtained by Ozkan (2014) and Kotera (2018). To illus-
trate, Ozkan (2014) finds that universal health insurance leads to a 1.25 year increase in life
expectancy at birth for individuals in the bottom income quintile.
So far, I have shown that the government can increase average life expectancy and re-
duce life expectancy inequality by expanding insurance coverage. To fully understand the
consequences of an insurance expansion, I next examine the macroeconomic effects of the
reform. The second part of Table 2.7 compares the key macroeconomic aggregates in the
two model environments. I find that the reform leads to an increase in GDP per capita by
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0.50 percent, owing to a 0.40 percent increase in labor supply per capita and a 0.68 per-
cent increase in capital per capita. The increase in labor supply is driven by four factors.
First, the increase in the size of the population caused by the rise in average life expectancy
leads to a higher labor force. Second, the increase in wages brought about by the increased
capital accumulation incentivizes agents to increase labor supply. Third, the presence of
universal health insurance means that low-income and medically indebted agents no longer
have an incentive to lower their labor supply to qualify for Medicaid. Lastly, the improve-
ments in health outcomes caused by higher investments in healthy consumption increases
labor productivity. I find that these effects more than offset the negative effect on labor
supply brought about by the higher tax burden needed to finance the reform. Similarly,
two factors contribute to the increase in capital accumulation. First, the increase in aver-
age life expectancy incentivizes agents to increase their savings in anticipation of a longer
retirement period. In addition, the increase in wages and the reduction in average out-of-
pocket medical spending brought about by the decline in the uninsurance rate contribute
to an increase in disposable income, thereby facilitating higher saving, especially among
the previously uninsured. My findings show that these effects more than offset the nega-
tive effect on saving brought about by both the higher tax burden and the lower medical
expenditure risk, the last of which lowers the need for precautionary saving.
Recall that health care spending is exogenous in the model, but that the distribution of
expenditure shocks depends on frailty. An expansion of insurance coverage therefore has
two effects on health care spending in the model. On the one hand, increased insurance
coverage lowers out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk, thereby reducing incentives to
maintain low frailty by investing in healthy consumption. This is the standard moral hazard
effect of health insurance. On the other hand, higher disposable income brought about by
the reduction in out-of-pocket medical spending facilitates higher investments in healthy
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consumption, especially among the previously uninsured. This lowers the probability of
experiencing high frailty shocks, thereby reducing expected health care spending. I find that
the latter effect more than offsets the moral hazard effect of health insurance. Accordingly,
the introduction of universal health insurance leads to a 0.18 percent decline in health care
spending per capita. This result is qualitatively inconsistent with Ozkan (2014), who finds
that universal health insurance leads to higher health care spending since the increase in
preventive medical spending exceeds the reduction in curative medical spending. That
said, the magnitude of the increase in health care spending in his model following the
introduction of universal health insurance is very close to zero. Lastly, although the tax
burden is higher in the model with universal health insurance, I find that consumption per
capita increases by 0.14 percent following the reform due to the increase in wages and the
reduction in out-of-pocket medical spending.
Next, I examine the implications for inequality, and find that both wealth and earnings
inequality are unaffected by the universal health insurance reform. In terms of the fiscal
implications of the reform, I find that the introduction of universal health insurance leads
to a 4.56 percentage point increase in government spending to GDP. Most of the increase is
driven by higher public health care spending, which increases from 9.37 to 13.78 percent
of GDP. The increase in average life expectancy also generates an increase in the size of
the elderly population, which in turn leads to a 0.05 percentage point increase in Social
Security spending to GDP.
I end the subsection by studying the welfare implications of the reform. I quantify the
welfare effects by means of consumption equivalent variations. In particular, I measure
how much consumption must change in all periods and contingencies in the benchmark
economy to make an unborn agent under the veil of ignorance indifferent between the
benchmark economy and the economy with universal health insurance. This provides a
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measure of the ex ante welfare effect of the reform, that is, before the agent knows her type.
I find that the universal health insurance reform leads to higher ex ante welfare. The results
show that consumption must increase by 1.82 percent in all periods and contingencies in
the benchmark model to equalize ex ante welfare in the two economies. A decomposition
of this finding shows that about 20 percent of the welfare gain can be attributed to the
improvements in average life expectancy. The remaining share is largely driven by the
reduction in the dispersion of consumption (that is, by the improvements in consumption
smoothing) brought about by the reduction in the uninsurance rate.
2.5.2 Expanding Medicaid
The previous subsection showed that universal health insurance would lead to higher life
expectancy, lower life expectancy inequality, lower health care spending, higher GDP per
capita, and generate large welfare gains, even after controlling for the increased tax burden
needed to finance the reform. These results were driven by higher consumption of healthy
goods, especially among the previously uninsured. This subsection studies the effects of
two alternative health insurance reforms that are designed to increase insurance coverage
among low-income agents. In particular, motivated by the recent expansion of Medicaid
under the ACA, I study the effects of two Medicaid reforms. First, an expansion of Med-
icaid to all agents with income no greater than 138.0 percent of the FPL. To do this, I
increase the Medicaid categorical income limit, yCAT , from its benchmark value of 90.2
percent of the FPL to 138.0 percent of the FPL. Next, an expansion of Medicaid to all
agents with income net of medical expenses no greater than 138.0 percent of the FPL. To
do this, I increase the Medicaid medically needy income limit, yMN , from its benchmark
value of 41.9 percent of the FPL to 138.0 percent of FPL. For brevity, I will refer to the
two reforms as the categorical reform and the medically needy reform, respectively. Both
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Table 2.8: Comparative statics: Expanding Medicaid
Variable Benchmark yCAT yMN
Life expectancy (years)
Life expectancy at 20 78.90 78.92 78.94
Life expectancy difference at 40 by income quartile 7.01 6.80 6.49
Macroeconomic aggregates (% change from bench.)
GDP per capita - -1.07 -2.38
Capital per capita - -1.83 -4.48
Effective labor supply per capita - -0.63 -1.18
health care spending per capita - -0.06 -0.12
Total consumption per capita - -1.04 -2.89
Government spending (percent)
Government spending to GDP 20.00 20.75 22.69
Public health care spending to GDP 9.37 9.98 11.79
Social Security spending to GDP 4.77 4.80 4.81
Inequality
GINI coefficient pre-tax earnings 0.67 0.68 0.68
GINI coefficient wealth 0.72 0.73 0.74
Notes: The table compares the benchmark model results with results from two counterfactual models:
an expansion of Medicaid to all agents with income no greater than 138 percent of the federal poverty
level (yCAT = 1.38FPL), and an expansion of Medicaid to all agents with income net of medical
expenses no greater than 138 percent of the federal poverty level (yMN = 1.38FPL).
reforms are financed through an increase in average income tax rates, a2. I then compare
the results from these reforms with the results from the universal health insurance reform
studied in the preceding section.
Consistent with the universal health insurance reform, I find that both Medicaid reforms
lead to higher average life expectancy. In particular, as shown in Table 2.8, I find that
the categorical and medically needy reform leads to an increase in average life expectancy
from 78.90 to 78.92 and 78.94 years, respectively. Similarly, life expectancy inequality, as
measured by the difference in life expectancy at age 40 by income quartile, declines from
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7.01 to 6.80 years following the increase in the Medicaid categorical income limit, and to
6.49 years following the increase in the Medicaid medically needy threshold. Recall that
life expectancy inequality declined by 0.41 years following the introduction of universal
health insurance. This shows that expanding the Medicaid medically needy program, which
leads to higher insurance coverage among low-income and medically indebted agents, leads
to a larger reduction in life expectancy inequality than a universal health insurance reform.
The second part of Table 2.8 studies the implications of the reforms for the macroecon-
omy. Recall that the universal health insurance reform led to an increase in both capital
accumulation and labor supply. As a result, GDP per capita was 0.50 percent higher in the
model with universal health insurance than in the benchmark model. In contrast, I find that
both Medicaid reforms lead to a reduction in capital accumulation and labor supply. As
a result, GDP per capita declines by 1.07 and 2.38 percent following the categorical and
medically needy reform, respectively. The reduction in capital per capita is partially driven
by lower private insurance take-up rates. That is, the expansion of Medicaid crowds out
private insurance enrollment. Since insurance premia enter the capital stock, this leads to
a reduction in capital per capita. The reduction in precautionary saving brought about by
lower out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk leads to further reductions in capital accu-
mulation. The decline in labor supply can be attributed to the reduction in wages brought
about by the reduction in capital accumulation, the increase in income tax rates needed to
finance the reforms, and the Medicaid means tests. In particular, because of the Medicaid
eligibility limits, uninsured agents with high medical costs have an incentive to reduce their
saving and labor supply to qualify for the program. Since Medicaid crowds out private in-
surance enrollment, the share of privately insured agents in the economy declines following
the expansion of Medicaid. As a result, more agents in the economy have an incentive to
lower their saving and labor supply to qualify for Medicaid in the event of high medical
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costs. Note, however, that these adverse implications for the macroeconomy are partially
offset by the higher saving and labor supply among agents at the low end of the income
distribution. This follows from the observation that the increase in the Medicaid income
limit allows these agents to both work and save more without losing eligibility for the pro-
gram. Lastly, I find that the reduction in income brought about by the reforms leads to a
1.04 and 2.89 percent drop in total consumption per capita following the categorical and
medically needy reform, respectively, even though health care spending per capita declines
moderately due to the improvements in health outcomes.
The categorical and medically needy reform lead to a 0.75 and a 2.69 percentage point
increase in government spending to GDP, respectively, almost all of which is driven by
higher public health care spending. Consistent with the universal health insurance reform,
I find that earnings inequality and wealth inequality are almost unaffected by the Medicaid
reforms. In particular, I find that the GINI coefficient of pre-tax earnings increases from
0.67 to 0.68 under both reforms. Similarly, I find that the GINI coefficient of wealth in-
creases from 0.72 to 0.73 under the Medicaid categorical eligibility reform, and to 0.74
under the Medicaid medically needy reform.
To summarize, the last two subsections have shown that expanding public insurance pro-
grams can increase average life expectancy and reduce life expectancy inequality, but that
these reforms can have very different implications for the macroeconomy. In particular,
whereas the universal health insurance reform led to higher consumption and higher GDP
per capita, I found that both Medicaid reforms had negative implications for the macroe-
conomy because they crowded out private insurance enrollment and incentivized agents to
reduce their saving and labor supply to qualify for the program. Therefore, a key advan-
tage of the universal health insurance reform is that it eliminates these work and saving
distortions since eligibility for public health insurance is no longer tied to income.
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2.5.3 Income tax reform
This subsection examines how life expectancy inequality is affected by the progressivity
of the income tax schedule. Recall from Section 2.3.4 that the shape of the income tax
schedule is determined by a0, a1, and a2. In what follows, I compare the benchmark model
results with the results derived using three alternative tax schedules. First, a proportional
tax schedule, where I set a1 equal to zero and adjust a0 to balance the government budget
(a2 is undefined when a1 equals zero). Second, a tax schedule characterized by higher max-
imum but lower marginal tax rates, where I set a0 equal to 0.400, a1 equal to its benchmark
value, and adjust a2 to balance the government budget. Lastly, a tax schedule characterized
by higher maximum marginal tax rates but also higher deductions, where I set a0 equal to
0.400, a2 equal to its benchmark value, and adjust a1 to balance the government budget.
For brevity, I refer to the three tax schedules as proportional, more progressive, and higher
deductions, respectively. These tax schedules, together with the benchmark tax schedule
used in the preceding sections, are illustrated in figure 8. The left and right panels plot
average and marginal tax rates by income, respectively, where income has been normalized
by GDP per capita.
The first part of Table 2.9 shows how life expectancy is affected by the progressivity of
the tax schedule. I find a positive relationship between average life expectancy and the
progressivity of the tax schedule. That is, higher tax progressivity is associated with higher
average life expectancy. This can be seen by comparing the columns in Table 2.9, which
shows that life expectancy at age 20 is 0.12 years lower in the economy with proportional
taxes than in the benchmark model, but 0.18 and 0.31 years higher in the economy with
more progressive taxes and higher deductions, respectively. Moreover, I find a negative
relationship between tax progressivity and life expectancy inequality. To illustrate, life
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Figure 2.8: Average and marginal income tax rates in the different models
Notes: The left panel plots average tax rates by income, where income has been normalized by GDP per
capita. The right panel plots marginal tax rates by income. The income tax function follows from Gouveia
and Strauss (1994). See Section 2.3.4 for details.
expectancy inequality by income is 0.33 years higher in the economy with proportional
taxes than in the benchmark model, but 0.80 years lower in the economy with higher tax
deductions for low-income agents.
Consistent with the optimal tax literature (see for example Conesa and Krueger (2006)),
I find that switching to a proportional income tax schedule leads to higher capital per capita
and higher labor supply per capita. This reflects the reduced disincentive effects to both
save and work for agents at the high end of the income distribution due to the reduced
marginal income tax rates for this group. As a result, GDP per capita is 1.77 percent higher
in the environment with proportional taxes than in the benchmark model. In contrast, GDP
per capita is 1.52 percent lower in the model with more progressive income taxes, and 3.12
percent lower in the model with higher deductions for low-income agents. This follows
from the increased marginal income tax rates, and hence increased disincentive effects to
both save and work, for agents at the high end of the income distribution. Combining these
findings with the results regarding the relationship between tax progressivity and life ex-
pectancy inequality discussed earlier suggests that there exists an equity-efficiency tradeoff
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Table 2.9: Comparative statics: Economy with different tax codes
Variable Bench. Propor. More prog. High deduct.
Tax parameters
α0 0.258 0.226 0.400 0.400
α1 0.768 0.000 0.768 2.540
α2 3.161 N/A 0.598 3.161
Life expectancy (years)
Life expectancy at 20 78.90 78.78 79.08 79.21
Life expectancy difference at 40 by income quartile 7.01 7.34 6.61 6.21
Macroeconomic agg. (perc. change from bench.)
GDP per capita - 1.77 -1.52 -3.12
Capital per capita - 4.86 -4.24 -8.08
Effective labor supply per capita - 0.08 0.04 -0.20
health care spending per capita - 0.43 -0.59 -1.03
Total consumption per capita - 0.13 -0.86 -2.56
Government spending (percent)
Government spending to GDP 20.00 19.88 20.08 20.26
Public health care spending to GDP 9.37 9.30 9.34 9.38
Social Security spending to GDP 4.77 4.70 4.85 4.92
Inequality
GINI coefficient pre-tax income 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
GINI coefficient wealth 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.68
Notes: The table compares the benchmark model results with the results derived using three alternative
income tax schedules: a proportional tax schedule, a more progressive tax schedule characterized by higher
maximum but lower marginal tax rates, and a tax schedule characterized by higher maximum marginal
rates but also higher deductions. The income tax functions follow from Gouveia and Strauss (1994). See
Section 2.3.4 for details.
in the economy, where equity is measured by life expectancy inequality and efficiency is
measured by GDP per capita. That is, higher tax progressivity leads to lower life expectancy
inequality but also lower GDP per capita, whereas lower tax progressivity leads to higher
life expectancy inequality but also higher GDP per capita. Consistent with this, the United
States has less progressive earnings taxes, but higher GDP per capita, than countries in
Western Europe (see for example Guvenen et al. (2014)), but both lower average life ex-
pectancy and higher life expectancy inequality than these countries. Hence, although these
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countries differ along several other dimensions that are likely to affect both average life
expectancy and life expectancy inequality such as the generosity and size of social insur-
ance programs, the degree of income and wealth inequality, and the educational attainment
of their citizens, these findings suggest that part of the difference might be driven by the
higher earnings inequality and the lower tax progressivity in the United States.
Higher redistribution benefits low-income agents, who respond to the rise in disposable
income by increasing their investments in healthy consumption. This lowers their proba-
bility of experiencing high frailty shocks, thereby reducing expected health care spending.
High-income agents, on the other hand, respond to the increased tax burden by lowering
their consumption of healthy goods, thereby increasing their medical expenditure risk. I
find that the former effect is larger than the latter, and hence that increased tax progressivity
leads to lower health care spending per capita. As shown in Table 2.9, health care spend-
ing per capita is 0.43 percent higher in the environment with proportional taxes than in the
benchmark model, but 1.03 percent lower in the environment with higher tax-deductions.
Again, consistent with this result, both tax progressivity and health care spending per capita
is higher in the United States than in other developed countries.
Higher GDP per capita in the model with proportional taxes contribute to a reduction
in government spending to GDP from 20.00 to 19.88 percent. In contrast, I find that gov-
ernment spending to GDP increases to 20.08 percent in the model with more progressive
taxes, and to 20.25 percent in the model with higher tax deductions for low-income agents.
A decomposition of the increase in government spending in these last two models shows
that most of the increase is driven by higher Social Security spending, which follows from
the increased old-age dependency ratio brought about by the rise in average life expectancy.
Lastly, I examine the implications for inequality, and find that earnings inequality is unaf-
fected by the tax reforms. This result is partially driven by the assumption that agents can
59
only work 20, 40, or 60 hours per week. As a result, the model might underestimate the
negative effect of more progressive taxes on hourly labor supply. It is thus plausible that
earnings inequality would be moderately affected by the tax reforms if agents were allowed
to choose their hourly labor supply from a continuous choice set. Wealth inequality, on the
other hand, is affected by the reform. In particular, I find that switching to a proportional tax
schedule leads to an increase in the GINI coefficient of wealth from 0.72 to 0.73. Switching
to a tax code with higher deductions for low-income agents, on the other hand, leads to a
reduction in the GINI coefficient of wealth from 0.72 to 0.68.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has developed a structural life cycle model with incomplete markets, hetero-
geneous agents, and endogenous health. I calibrated the model to match several facts about
the population health distribution that I documented by constructing an objective measure
of health called a frailty index. In particular, I showed that the model could account for
the considerable heterogeneity in frailty in the population, the implications of frailty for
mortality risk, medical expenditure risk, and labor market outcomes, and the relationship
between frailty and income, education, and wealth.
I then used the model to study how policies could be designed to reduce life expectancy
inequality, focusing on health insurance and income tax reforms. I started by studying
the effects of a tax-financed universal health insurance reform. I found that the reform
led to an increase in life expectancy at age 20 by 0.10 years and to a 0.41 year reduction
in the difference in life expectancy at age 40 by income quartile. Moreover, I found that
the improvements in the population health distribution brought about by the reform led to
a 0.18 percent reduction in health care spending per capita. In addition, GDP per capita
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increased by 0.50 percent due to both higher capital accumulation and higher labor supply,
which in turn contributed to a 0.14 percent increase in consumption per capita. Lastly, I
found that the universal health insurance reform led to higher ex ante welfare. In particular,
I showed that consumption had to increase by 1.82 percent in all periods and contingencies
in the benchmark model to make an unborn agent under the veil of ignorance indifferent
between the benchmark economy and the economy with universal health insurance.
I then compared the results from the universal health insurance reform with two Medicaid
reforms designed to increase insurance coverage among low-income agents. Consistent
with the universal health insurance reform, I found that the expansion of Medicaid led to
higher average life expectancy and lower life expectancy inequality. On the other hand,
I found that the expansion of Medicaid had negative implications for the macroeconomy
since it incentivized more agents to reduce their saving and labor supply to qualify for
the program. Lastly, I studied the implications of three income tax reforms. I found that
the increased redistribution brought about by the higher tax progressivity led to higher life
expectancy, lower life expectancy inequality, and lower health care spending per capita.
Such increases in tax progressivity, however, had adverse implications for GDP per capita
due to the increased disincentive effects to both save and work.
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Chapter 3
Medical bankruptcy:
A rationale for uninsurance
62
3.1 Introduction
Individuals face considerable financial risk from medical expense shocks. Average annual
medical expenses increase from $2,500 for 25-year-olds to well over $6,000 for people
towards the end of their working-life. Yet, a quarter of the American working-age pop-
ulation, or about 48 million individuals, were uninsured in 2010. Understanding why so
many Americans are uninsured has long been at the heart of the health economics litera-
ture. Although several theories have been considered, none of them can account for the
high uninsurance rate observed in the data (Gruber, 2008).
Recent work by Mahoney (2015) suggests that the high uninsurance rate can be partially
explained by the country’s bankruptcy laws. The ability to file for Chapter 7 consumer
bankruptcy distorts the insurance coverage decision by providing households with a form
of high-deductible health insurance. Households thus respond by opting out of private
health insurance. Using state-level variations in bankruptcy laws, Mahoney (2015) finds
that bankruptcy does have an economically significant effect on the uninsurance rate. His
estimates show that if the bankruptcy laws of the least debtor-friendly state were applied
nationally, 8 percent of the uninsured population would take up coverage.
Despite the law’s importance, very little is known about how much people value the
ability to file for medical bankruptcy. For instance, how much would people lose if the
law was eliminated? Little is also known about the interaction effects between Chapter 7
and public insurance programs such as Medicaid. In particular, does medical bankruptcy
also crowd out Medicaid enrollment? To answer these questions, I develop a general equi-
librium overlapping generations model that accounts for several features of the US health
insurance system and Chapter 7 of the US bankruptcy code. Agents in the model face
idiosyncratic risk to their labor productivity and medical expenses, the latter of which are
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partially insurable through private insurance and Medicaid. Agents also have the ability to
file for medical bankruptcy. Consistent with program rules, filing for bankruptcy releases
the debtor from all liabilities. In return, the filer must forfeit all non-exempt assets to the
creditor. The filer then starts the following period with a bankruptcy flag on her credit
report. This flag remains on the agent’s credit report for several years, during which she
cannot file for another Chapter 7 discharge.
I calibrate the model to match three sets of data moments: the percentage of Chapter
7 filers due to medical debt; the distribution of medical expenses by age and insurance
provider; and both the persistence and distribution of labor earnings. Validation exercises
show that the model also matches several non-targeted moments such as the concentration
of wealth. I then use the calibrated model to study the effects of an unexpected elimina-
tion of Chapter 7. This policy experiment enables me to quantify the effects of medical
bankruptcy on the private insurance take-up rate, Medicaid enrollment, and welfare.
Consistent with Mahoney (2015), I find that the ability to file for medical bankruptcy has
an economically significant effect on the aggregate insurance rate in the economy. Chapter
7 lowers private insurance enrollment across the working-age population by 2.0 percentage
points. With a working-age population of about 190 million, this translates into a reduction
in private insurance take-up by 3.8 million individuals. In other words, 8 percent of the
uninsured working-age population would take up private coverage if they did not have the
option to file for bankruptcy. Medicaid enrollment, on the other hand, is positively affected
by Chapter 7. I find that 0.2 percentage points of the working-age population would lose
Medicaid eligibility if they did not have the option to file for bankruptcy. This follows from
the observation that capital, and hence wages, are higher in the economy without Chapter
7, both of which lower the percentage of households that pass the Medicaid income and
asset eligibility tests. As a result, I find that Chapter 7 lowers the insurance coverage rate
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by 1.8 percentage points.
I then compute a transition path between the steady state of the economy with and with-
out Chapter 7. Private insurance enrollment increases by 1.7 percentage points, or about 3.2
million people, within the first two years following the elimination of Chapter 7. In other
words, 85 percent of the increase in the private insurance take-up rate takes place within the
first two years of the transition. Medicaid enrollment, on the other hand, declines steadily
during the transition. As a result, I find that most of the increase in the insurance coverage
rate would take place within the first years following the elimination of bankruptcy. In
comparison, about 11.7 million people took up coverage during the first two years of the
Affordable Care Act. This shows that reforming the bankruptcy laws can have considerable
short run implications for the insurance coverage rate.
Lastly, I study the welfare implications of the ability to file for medical bankruptcy. The
results show that 79.6 percent of the population is better off in the economy with medical
bankruptcy because of the implicit insurance provided by this option. To quantify the wel-
fare effects on those that benefit and lose from the reform, I compute the dollar value of how
much wealth must change in the initial steady state to make the agents weakly better off in
the economy with bankruptcy than in the transition to the economy without bankruptcy. I
find that those that benefit from the reform experience an average welfare gain that is equiv-
alent to receiving $400 higher wealth in the steady state with bankruptcy. In contrast, those
that lose from the reform experience an average welfare loss that is equivalent to a $2,900
reduction in wealth. As a result, I find that aggregate welfare is higher in the economy with
medical bankruptcy.
Related literature: This chapter is most closely related to Mahoney (2015), who also
studies the interaction between bankruptcy and health insurance. Using data from the Med-
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ical Expenditure Panel Survey, the Survey of Income and Program Participation, and the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, he shows that households with a higher financial cost of
filing for bankruptcy are more likely to be insured. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that the ability to file for a Chapter 7 debt discharge crowds out conventional health insur-
ance coverage by providing households with a form of high-deductible health insurance.
My chapter differs from Mahoney’s along several dimensions. First, I study the effect of
bankruptcy on health insurance coverage within a general equilibrium life cycle model.
Second, I use the model to study the interaction between Chapter 7 and Medicaid and the
interaction between bankruptcy and the cost of health services. Lastly, I compute a transi-
tion from an economy with to an economy without Chapter 7. This enables me to quantify
the welfare effects of the ability to file for medical bankruptcy.
The model I use follows closely the models used by Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013)
and Jung and Tran (2016), who develop life cycle models that are consistent with the US
health insurance system to quantify the effects of the Affordable Care Act on the insurance
take-up rate and welfare. A similar model is used by Conesa et al. (2018) to study the gen-
eral equilibrium effects of Medicare. I extend their models by introducing the possibility
to default on medical debt by filing for bankruptcy. This enables me to quantify the general
equilibrium effects of bankruptcy within a life cycle model that features both a rich set of
institutional details of the US health insurance system and the key characteristics of the US
bankruptcy code.
The chapter builds on the literature that studies consumer bankruptcy in incomplete mar-
ket economies. Athreya (2002) develops a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
with unsecured debt and default to study the welfare effects of bankruptcy. He finds large
negative welfare effects of bankruptcy, brought about by the observation that bankruptcy
lowers the interest rate on savings and increases the interest rate on loans, both of which
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adversely affect consumption smoothing. Livshits et al. (2007), on the other hand, using
a heterogeneous agent life cycle model where households can file for bankruptcy, find that
the US bankruptcy law may be welfare improving. Similarly, Chatterjee et al. (2007) study
the welfare effects of alternative bankruptcy rules and find that a means test that discourages
households with above-median income to file for bankruptcy increases welfare.
Lastly, I contribute to a long tradition in the literature that uses dynamic general equi-
librium models with incomplete markets in the spirit of Bewley (1986), Hugget (1993),
and Aiyagari (1994). The chapter belongs to the branch of the literature that augments the
standard model with medical expenditure risk as in Hubbard et al. (1994), Palumbo (1999),
and De Nardi et al. (2010).
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents the data used in this
chapter. Section 3.4 and 3.5 lay out the environment of the model and present the recursive
problem of the household. Next, I explain in Section 3.6 how I map the model to the data.
Section 3.7 presents the quantitative analysis. Lastly, Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Data
Health expenditure data is obtained from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS),
which provides detailed records on demographics, income, medical expenses, and insur-
ance for a nationally representative sample of households. The survey consists of two-year
overlapping panels for the period 1996 to 2013, from which I use data for individuals aged
20 to 85 years.1
Table 3.1 reports the insurance coverage rate by age in 2010. Here, private insurance
1Nominal series are converted to 2010 dollars by means of the GDP deflator.
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Table 3.1: Insurance coverage rate by age (MEPS)
Age 18-24 29-29 30-34 35-54 55-64 18-64 65+
Private insurance 50.5 56.7 60.1 68.2 71.3 64.1 39.6
Uninsured 37.4 33.6 28.7 22.3 17.0 25.1 1.0
Notes: This table reports the insurance coverage rate by age groups. Data source: MEPS.
includes both employer-provided and privately purchased health insurance. As shown in
the table, 74.9 percent of the working-age population was covered by a private or public
health insurance plan. The remaining 25.1 percent of the population, or about 48 million
people, was uninsured. The uninsurance rate was declining with age, from more than
one-third for individuals in their twenties to 17.0 percent for people around the age of
retirement. Most of this reduction could be attributed to private insurance enrollment,
which increased from 50.5 to 71.3 percent over the course of an individual’s working life. In
fact, more than 80 percent of the insured non-elderly population was enrolled in a private or
employer-based plan, while 17 percent was covered by Medicaid. In contrast, the insurance
coverage rate among the elderly was near universal due to Medicare, which provided health
insurance to 97 percent of the elderly population. More than 14 percent of the elderly
were also covered by Medicaid. As a result, only 1 percent of the elderly population was
uninsured in 2010.
3.3 Model
The following subsections lay out the environment of the economy. The recursive prob-
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lem of the household and the definition of the equilibrium are given in Section 3.5.
3.3.1 Legal environment
Households can discharge their medical debt by filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. To qualify
for a Chapter 7 discharge, agents first have to pass an eligibility test. In the model, house-
holds pass this test if their income net of allowable expenses is sufficiently low. Households
also qualify for a Chapter 7 discharge if both their disposable income is low enough and
annual payments of this amount over 5 years would pay back less than 25 percent of the
agent’s medical debt. More details about the allowable expense limits are given in Sec-
tion 3.6.1 below. Agents that pass the eligibility test can file for bankruptcy to get their
medical debt discharged. In return, they have to forfeit all non-exempt assets, a, to the
creditor (here, the hospital), and pay court filing fees, ψ . Current and future earnings, on
the other hand, are retained by the filer. The agent then starts the following period with a
bankruptcy flag on her credit record. I assume that households with a flag on their report
are ineligible to file for bankruptcy. The flag also lowers their credit score, which increases
their unit cost of consumption by ζ . This pecuniary cost of a bad credit record is motivated
by the observation that the price of certain services such as auto insurance and mortgage
payments are often linked to credit scores. Lastly, in every period, there is an exogenous
probability λ that the bankruptcy flag will disappear from the agent’s report. That is, there
is a chance that the agent will have her record expunged in the following period. This is a
computationally convenient way to model the fact that US law does not permit households
to file for Chapter 7 more than once every eight years, and that bankruptcy flags only stay
on an individual’s credit record for a finite number of years.
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3.3.2 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of ex-ante heterogeneous agents. An agent’s
type is given by s = ( j,a, f ,h,η , i) , where j is age, a is assets, f is a bankruptcy flag, h
is health status, η is labor productivity, and i is the household’s health insurance status.
Throughout, I will let the mass of agents of type s be denoted by Φ(s) . The bankruptcy
flag is a zero-one indicator, where zero means the household does not have a bankruptcy
flag on her credit record. Health is stochastic and follows a stationary finite-state Markov
process that depends on age and health. Labor productivity is governed by a deterministic
and stochastic process. The deterministic process, ε j, is a function of the household’s age.
The stochastic process is given by a finite-state Markov process with stationary transitions
over time. Lastly, the household’s health insurance status can take on one of three values:
the agent is self-insured, has private health insurance, or has health insurance provided by
her employer. Health insurance is used to cover non-discretionary medical services, m jh,
that vary with the agent’s age and health status.
Households are endowed with one unit of time in every period that can be allocated to
work or leisure. In addition to leisure, households also derive utility from consumption, c.
The period-by-period return function is given by:
u(c, `) =
[
cγ (1− `)1−γ
]1−σ
1−σ (1)
All households retire exogenously at age jr, after which they receive Social Security ben-
efits SS. They also receive government-provided health insurance in the form of Medicare.
Lastly, households have a maximum lifespan of J years. They also face a positive proba-
bility of death, ψ jh, in every period that depends on their age and health. In the event of
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death, the agent’s assets are uniformly distributed across the population by means of lump
sum transfers, B.
3.3.3 Hospital sector
Medical services, m jh, are produced by the hospital sector. The hospital sector takes in
the composite consumption good as an input and transforms it one-for-one into medical
services. In the model, as in the real world, some households might partially or fully default
on their medical bills. Hospital revenues thus depend on both the mass of agents that repay
their debt, and on how much the hospital receives in the event of a partial default. Let d (s)
denote the probability that a household of type s defaults on her medical bills. Hospital
revenues are then given by:
∫ [
(1−d (s))m jh+d (s)ν (s)m jh
]
Φ(s) (2)
where ν (s) ∈ [0,1) is the share of medical bills that an agent of type s repays in the event
of a default. In order to ensure zero profits, hospitals charge a markup H ≥ 0 over their
marginal cost of production of medical services. H is thus set to balance the following
equation:
1
H
∫
m jhΦ(ds) =
∫ [
(1−d (s))m jh+d (s)ν (s)m jh
]
Φ(ds) (3)
Note that this means that defaulters exert a negative externality on everyone else by increas-
ing the list price of medical services.
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3.3.4 Technology
Firms hire labor at wage w and rent capital at rate r from the households to minimize costs.
The technology is given by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function:
Y = AKαN1−α (4)
where A denotes total factor productivity, K is the aggregate capital stock, N denotes aggre-
gate labor supply in efficiency units, and α is capital’s share of income. Output is used for
consumption, investment, and medical expenses, M/H, where the markup H is consistent
with zero profits in the hospital sector. This gives the following resource constraint:
C+
M
H
+K′ = AKαN1−α +(1−δ )K (5)
where δ is the rate of depreciation.
3.3.5 Health insurance
Health insurance is available in the form of private insurance and public insurance, the latter
of which is provided by the government through Medicare and Medicaid. Let χP, χCARE ,
and χCAID denote the copayment parameter on private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid,
respectively. These parameters govern the share of medical expenses that are covered by
the different types of health insurance that are available in the economy.
Medicare provides health insurance to all elderly individuals. I assume that Medicare is
the primary payer for all elderly households. That is, if an elderly agent has both Medicare
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and private insurance, Medicare pays first.2 Medicaid, on the other hand, is a means-tested
program that provides health insurance to low-income households. In order to qualify for
Medicaid in the model, households must pass the categorical or medically needy eligibility
test. Households pass the categorical test if the sum of their gross income and interest
earnings is less than the categorical limit. Similarly, agents pass the medically needy test if
the sum of their gross income and interest earnings net of out-of-pocket medical expenses
is less than the medically needy income limit and their assets are less than the asset limit. I
refer the reader to Section 3.6.2 for further details about the Medicaid means tests.
Lastly, households can purchase private insurance for the following period at an actuari-
ally fair price that depends on the agent’s age and health. This gives the following formula
for the private health insurance premium:
pi jh =

ψ jh(1−χP)
∫
m j′h′Q j(h,dh′)
(1+r′) if j < jr−1
ψ jh(1−χP)χCARE
∫
m j′h′Q j(h,dh′)
(1+r′) if j ≥ jr−1
(6)
where the second line captures the assumption that Medicare is the primary payer for all
elderly agents.
2Elderly households have an incentive to purchase private insurance whenever χCARE > 0, that is, whenever
Medicare pays for less than 100 percent of the elderly’s medical expenses.
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3.3.6 Government
The government balances its budget period-by-period by means of payroll taxes, τ. Let b
denote the Social Security replacement rate. Social Security benefits SS are then given by:
SS=
bwN∫
Φ({1, . . . , jr−1}×dh×dη×da×di) (7)
I assume that the proceeds from selling consumption goods at a price higher than marginal
cost due to a low credit score goes to the government. That is, government revenues
from taxing consumption is given by ζC1, whereC1 denotes aggregate consumption across
households with a bankruptcy flag on their credit report. The government also derives rev-
enues from bankruptcy filing costs ψF1, where F1 is the measure of agents that files for a
debt discharge. Lastly, let gov denote total government expenditure on Medicare, Medi-
caid, and food stamps, where the last guarantees a minimum consumption level, c. Taxes
on labor income then have to satisfy:
τ =
SS
∫
Φ({ jr, . . . ,J}×dh×dη×da×di)+gov−ζC1−ψF1
wN
(8)
3.4 Household problem
Before I present the household problem, let me go through the timing of events. At the be-
ginning of the period, agents observe the realizations of their idiosyncratic health and labor
productivity shock, the former of which determines the value of their medical expenses.
Households that ended the preceding period with a bankruptcy flag on their credit record
also observe whether or not their record have been expunged. Next, households receive
transfers from accidental bequests and from private insurance companies if they purchased
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health insurance in the preceding period. Eligible households also receive transfers from
the government in the form of Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security. Then, households
supply labor and capital to the firm, following which production takes place and house-
holds receive factor income. Next, agents pay out-of-pocket medical expenses and make
their intertemporal decisions regarding saving and insurance. That is, households choose
how much to allocate to consumption and saving, and whether or not to purchase private
health insurance for the following period. Households that do not have sufficient resources
to pay their medical bills forfeit their assets to the hospital and pay a fraction of their earn-
ings or Social Security benefits net of health insurance expenses. Lastly, all agents that are
eligible to file for bankruptcy compare the value of these choices with the value of filing for
Chapter 7. If the latter is higher, the agent forfeits her non-exempt assets to the hospital. In
return, her debt is discharged, and the agent starts the following period with a bankruptcy
flag on her report.
3.4.1 Working-age households
Recall that an agent’s type is given by s = ( j,a, f ,h,η , i) , where j is age, a is assets, f
is a bankruptcy indicator, h is health status, η is labor productivity, and i is the house-
hold’s health insurance status. Let V I(s) denote the value of a working-age household of
type s that does not file for bankruptcy. Similarly, let VB(s) denote the value of filing for
bankruptcy. Working-age households that qualify for a Chapter 7 debt discharge choose
whether or not to file for bankruptcy:
V (s) = max
{
V I (s) ,VB (s)
}
(9)
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where V I(s) is given by:
V I (s) = max
c,a′,`,i′
u(c+ IFS (s, `)c, `)+βψ jh∑
f ′
λ
(
f ′| f )∫∫ V (s′)Q(η ,dη ′)Q j (h,dh′)
s.t. (1+ fζ )c+a′+mop+ IP
(
i′
)
pi jh = w(1− τ)ε jη`
+(1+ r)(a+B)+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)mop if x> 0
(1+ fζ )c= (1−κ)[w(1− τ)ε jη`− IP(i′)pi jh] if x≤ 0
x= w(1− τ)ε jη`+(1+ r)(a+B)+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)mop−mop
mop = IP (i)χPm jh+(1− IP (i))m jh
IP (i) =

1 if i= iP
0 otherwise
c, `,a′ ≥ 0
i′ ∈ {iP, iS}
Here, f = 0 means the agent does not have a bankruptcy flag on her report. Conversely,
f = 1 means the agent has a flag on her credit record due to a recent bankruptcy filing. The
bankruptcy flag lowers the agent’s credit score, which increases her unit cost of consump-
tion by ζ . An insurance status of i = iP means the household has private insurance, while
i= iS means the household did not purchase private insurance in the preceding period, and
is hence self-insured today. Out-of-pocket medical expenses are denoted by mop, which
are given by m jh for self-insured households and χPm jh for agents with private health in-
surance. Households that are eligible for food stamps, IFS (s, `) = 1, receive a transfer c
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from the government.3 If the household qualifies for Medicaid, a fraction χCAID of her
out-of-pocket medical expenses will be covered by the government. This is captured by the
indicator function on the right-hand side of the first budget constraint, which equals one for
all agents that qualify for Medicaid.
Next, x denotes the resources that are available after out-of-pocket medical expenses have
been paid. x≤ 0 means the agent does not have sufficient resources to pay her medical debt,
and is hence forced to partially default on her liabilities. Households that do not have the
resources to pay their medical bills have to forfeit their assets to the hospital and pay a
fraction κ of their earnings net of health insurance expenses. They are also not permitted
to save. In that case, hospital revenues are given by:
Hosp= κ
[
w(1− τ)ε jη`− IP (i′)pi jh
]
+(1+ r)(a+B)+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)m jh < m jh if i= iS
Hosp= κ
[
w(1− τ)ε jη`− IP (i′)pi jh
]
+(1+ r)(a+B)
+(1−χP)m jh+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)χPm jh < m jh if i= iP
(10)
where the inequalities follow from the assumption that households cannot default on their
liabilities if they have sufficient resources to pay their debt. Lastly, as noted in Section 3.4.1,
households that start the period with a bankruptcy flag on their report face a probability
λ ( f ′ = 0| f = 1) that their record will be expunged in the following period. Households
that start the period without a flag on their credit record, on the other hand, retain their
current credit record with certainty, i.e., λ ( f ′ = 0| f = 0) = 1.
Alternatively, if the agent qualifies for a Chapter 7 debt discharge, that is, if she passes
3I abstract from the observation that individuals qualify for food stamps in the US. if their gross income
is less than 130 percent of the federal poverty level, and assume that food stamps are only available to
households that work zero hours and have insufficient assets to pay their medical debt (i.e., (1+ r)(a+B)≤
IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)mop−mop).
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the eligibility test and does not currently have a bankruptcy flag on her report, she can file
for bankruptcy:
VB (s) = max
c,`,i′
u(c+ IFS (s, `)c, `)+βψh j
∫∫
V
(
s′
)
Q
(
η ,dη ′
)
Q j
(
h,dh′
)
s.t. c+ IP(i′)pi jh+ψ = w(1− τ)ε jη`+min{(1+ r)(a+B) ,a}
f ′ = 1
a′ = 0
`,c≥ 0
i′ ∈ {iP, iS}
The debt discharge releases the debtor from all liabilities. In return, the filer must forfeit
all non-exempt assets, a, to the hospital, and pay court filing fees, ψ . Current and future
earnings, on the other hand, are retained by the agent. Hospital revenues are thus given by:
Hosp= max{(1+ r)(a+B)− a,0}+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)m jh if i= iS
Hosp= max{(1+ r)(a+B)− a,0}+(1−χP)m jh+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)χPm jh if i= iP
(11)
Remaining assets are used for consumption and purchase of health insurance. I assume that
households are not permitted to save in the period they file for bankruptcy. This is motivated
by the fact that US law does not permit those who invoke bankruptcy to simultaneously
accumulate assets. Lastly, agents that file for bankruptcy start the following period with a
bankruptcy flag on their report.
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3.4.2 Retired households
Let VR(s) denote the value of a retired agent of type s that does not file for bankruptcy.
Retired households that qualify for a Chapter 7 debt discharge choose whether or not to file
for bankruptcy:
V (s) = max
{
VR (s) ,VB (s)
}
(12)
where VR(s) is given by:
VR (s) = max
c,a′,i′
u(c+ IFS (s,0)c,0)+βψ jh∑
f ′
λ
(
f ′| f )∫∫ V (s′)Q(η ,dη ′)Q j (h,dh′)
s.t. (1+ fζ )c+a′+mop+ IP(i′)pi jh = SS
+(1+ r)(a+B)+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)mop if x> 0
(1+ fζ )c= (1−κ)[SS− IP(i′)pi jh] if x≤ 0
x= SS+(1+ r)(a+B)+ IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)mop−mop
mop = IP (i)χPχCAREm jh+(1− IP (i))χCAREm jh
IP (i) =

1 if i= iP
0 otherwise
c,a′ ≥ 0
i′ ∈ {iP, iS}
Retired households receive Social Security benefits and Medicare from the government.
Medicare lowers the agents’ out-of-pocket medical expenses, which are given by χCAREm jh
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for households that did not purchase private insurance in the preceding period and χCAREχPm jh
for agents that have private health insurance. In the event that an agent does not have suf-
ficient resources to pay her medical debt, she forfeits her assets to the hospital and pays a
fraction κ of her Social Security benefits net of health insurance expenses. The agent is
also not permitted to save. Hospital revenues are then given by:
Hosp= max
{
κ
[
SS− IP (i′)pi jh
]
,0
}
+(1+ r)(a+B)+(1−χCARE)m jh
+IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)χCAREm jh < m jh if i= iS
Hosp= max
{
κ
[
SS− IP (i′)pi jh
]
,0
}
+(1+ r)(a+B)+(1−χCARE)m jh+(1−χP)χCAREm jh
+IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)χCAREχPm jh < m jh if i= iP
(13)
where the inequalities again follow from the assumption that households are not permitted
to default on their debt if they have sufficient resources to pay the hospital.
Alternatively, as long as the agent passes the eligibility test and does not have a Chapter
7 bankruptcy flag on her credit record, she can file for bankruptcy:
VB (s) = max
c,i′
u(c+ IFS (s,0)c,0)+βψh j
∫∫
V
(
s′
)
Q
(
η ,dη ′
)
Q j
(
h,dh′
)
s.t. c+ IP(i′)pi jh+ψ = SS+min{(1+ r)(a+B) ,a}
f ′ = 1
a′ = 0
c≥ 0
i′ ∈ {iP, iS}
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As earlier, filers forfeit their non-exempt assets to the hospital. Current and future So-
cial Security benefits, on the other hand, are retained by the agent. In return, the creditor
releases the debtor from all liabilities. This gives the following expression for hospital
revenues:
Hosp= max{(1+ r)(a+B)− a,0}+(1−χCARE)m jh
+IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)χCAREm jh if i= iS
Hosp= max{(1+ r)(a+B)− a,0}+(1−χCARE)m jh+(1−χP)χCAREm jh
+IMed (s, `)(1−χCAID)χCAREχPm jh if i= iP
(14)
3.4.3 Definition of equilibrium
Given an asset exemption level, a, bankruptcy filing costs, ψ, a Social Security replacement
rate, b, copayment parameters χP, χCARE , and χCAID, Medicaid eligibility thresholds, and
initial conditions for capital K1 and the measure of types Φ1, an equilibrium in this model
is a sequence of model variables such that:
1. Taking prices, insurance costs, government policies, and accidental bequests as given,
households maximize utility subject to their constraints.
2. Hospital markup pricing is consistent with zero profits.
3. Factor prices satisfy marginal product pricing conditions.
4. Government policies satisfy the government budget constraint.
5. All market clearing conditions are met.
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6. Aggregate law of motion for Φ is induced by the policy functions and the exogenous
stochastic processes for idiosyncratic health and labor productivity.
3.5 Calibration
This section describes how I calibrate the model. The section starts by describing the
calibration of the bankruptcy parameters. I then explain how I derive the insurance coin-
surance rates and how the Medicaid income and asset limits are determined. Attention is
also given to how these limits are affected when I introduce the Affordable Care Act in
Section 3.7.2. Lastly, I discuss the calibration of the earnings process and the life cycle
parameters.
3.5.1 Bankruptcy parameters
I set the probability λ that an agent with a bankruptcy flag on her report will have her
record expunged in the following period to generate an average duration of bankruptcy
spells of nine years. That is, filing for bankruptcy leaves a flag on the agent’s report for
the next nine years on average, during which the household cannot file for another Chapter
7 discharge. The bankruptcy flag also lowers the agent’s credit score, which increases her
cost of consumption. The probability is chosen to match the fact that US bankruptcy law
does not permit households to file and receive a Chapter 7 debt discharge more than once
every eight years and that bankruptcy flags remain on an agent’s credit record for up to ten
years.
Filers must pay court filing fees and legal fees.4 These fees vary from state to state, but
4Throughout, I abstract from the observation that courts may waive the bankruptcy filing fees if the debtor’s
income is less than 150 percent of the federal poverty level.
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typically range from $1,500 to $2,500. I pick an intermediate value and set the filing fee
to $2,000. Filing for bankruptcy lowers the household’s credit score and increases her unit
cost of consumption by ζ . I calibrate this parameter to match the percentage of Chapter 7
filers due to medical debt. The literature has produced a wide range of estimates for this
share, ranging from 16.4 percent (Chatterjee et al., 2007) to 62.1 percent (Himmelstein et
al., 2009). Gross and Notowidigdo (2011) use cross-state variation in Medicaid expansions
from 1992 to 2004 to quantify this and find that, among low-income households, 26 percent
of consumer bankruptcies can be attributed to out-of-pocket medical expenses. A more re-
cent study by Austin (2015), using responses from a nationwide survey of bankruptcy filers,
finds that medical debt is the predominant causal factor in 18 to 26 percent of consumer
bankruptcies. I pick a value between these estimates and assume that 25 percent of con-
sumer bankruptcies can be attributed to medical debt. With a ratio of filers to total adult
population of 0.50 percent, this gives a target share of 0.13 percent.5
The type and value of assets that can be seized in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing vary from
state to state. As an example, Kansas allows households to exempt the full value of their
property and claim $40,000 in vehicle exemptions. The corresponding exemption levels in
Delaware, on the other hand, are zero for both home and vehicle equity. Some states also
allow households to claim a wildcard exemption that can be used for all assets, ranging
from $200 in Iowa to $60,000 in Texas. As the only asset in the model is saving, I set
the exemption limit, a, to match the $6,000 median wildcard exemption limit across the 33
states with positive wildcard exemptions.
Households that do not have the resources to pay their medical bills pay a fraction κ of
their earnings or Social Security benefits net of health insurance expenses. This parameter
5According to data from the Administrative Office of the US Courts, 1.10 million people filed for Chapter 7
in 2010. This gives a ratio of filers to total adult population of 0.50 percent.
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affects the households’ precautionary saving motive. The higher the value, the lower the
value of post-garnished resources available for consumption. This increases precautionary
saving, which in turn lowers the share of households that have to partially default on their
medical bills. I follow a similar calibration strategy as Chatterjee et al. (2007) and calibrate
the wage garnishing parameter to match the percentage of individuals with medical debt.
Following the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Chap-
ter 7 is restricted to households that pass a means or repayment test. Agents pass the means
test if their gross income is less than the state median income or if their disposable income
is sufficiently low, where disposable income is defined as income net of allowable expenses
for food, clothing, housing, health and child care, alimony, education, transportation, taxes,
insurance, and secured debt payments. Each county and metropolitan region has different
allowable expense amounts for these categories. Following Mahoney (2015), I set the dis-
posable income limit to $1,320 per year. Households pass the repayment test if both their
disposable income is less than $2,190 per year and annual payments of this amount over 5
years would pay back less than 25 percent of the agent’s unsecured debt (Mahoney, 2015).
The bankruptcy parameters are summarized in Table 3.2.
3.5.2 Health insurance and Affordable Care Act parameters
I follow Conesa et al. (2018) and let the coverage rate on each insurance plan be given by
the average share of expenses covered across households in the MEPS with that insurance
plan as their primary insurance provider, the last of which is defined as the insurer that
pays for the largest share of the agent’s expenses. This gives a coverage rate on private
insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid of 77.1, 70.9, and 86.2 percent. The coinsurance rate
on the three insurance plans are then given by the complement of these shares.
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Table 3.2: Bankruptcy parameters determined jointly in equilibrium
Parameter Description Target or source Value
Determined outside the model
λ Average duration of bankruptcy spell Office of the US Courts 0.100
Ψ Bankruptcy filing cost 0.043
a Asset exemption limit Mahoney (2015) 0.113
Determined jointly in equilibrium
ζ Increase in cost of cons. after bankruptcy Perc. of med. bankrupcty files = 0.1 0.164
κ Wage garnishing parameter Perc. with medical debt = 1.7 0.242
Chapter 7 eligibility limits
Disposable income test Mahoney (2015) 0.025
Repayment test Mahoney (2015) 0.041
Notes: The table lists the bankruptcy parameters that are determined outside the model and those that are
determined jointly in equilibrium.
The benchmark model is calibrated to match the key features of the US health insurance
system prior to the Affordable Care Act (ACA). I therefore set the Medicaid income and
asset thresholds to match the corresponding limits in the data that prevailed in the US at that
time. Following Conesa et al. (2018), I set the income and asset eligibility thresholds to
match the corresponding weighted average limits across US states, with weights given by
each state’s share of total health expenses. Using data from the Kaiser Family Foundation,
I obtain a medically needy income limit of 41.9 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL),
a medically needy asset threshold of $1,950, and a categorical income limit of 90.2 percent
of the FPL.6
Section 3.7.2 incorporates the key features of the ACA to study how the results depend
on the specifics of the health insurance environment. The ACA expanded the Medicaid
program to cover all households with income less than 133 percent of the FPL. In addition,
all households that are not covered by Medicare or Medicaid must buy private insurance or
pay a penalty, where the penalty is given by the maximum of $695 and 2.5 percent of the
6The FPL is about 23 percent of GDP per capita.
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Table 3.3: Health insurance and Affordable Care Act parameters
Parameter Description Source Value
Insurance coinsurance parameters
χP Private insurance MEPS 0.229
χCARE Medicare MEPS 0.291
χCAID Medicaid MEPS 0.138
Medicaid eligibility limits (pre ACA)
Categorical income Kaiser Family Foundation 0.197
Medically needy income Kaiser Family Foundation 0.092
Medically needy assets Kaiser Family Foundation 0.041
ACA parameters
Income limit Kaiser Family Foundation 0.291
τ Minimum tax filing amount Kaiser Family Foundation 0.189
Notes: The table lists the health insurance parameters that are determined outside the
model.
household’s income net of the minimum tax filing amount. I include the first feature of the
law by replacing the three Medicaid eligibility tests by a single income test, whereby all
households qualify for the program if their income is less than the corresponding limit in
the data. Lastly, I set the minimum tax filing amount to $10,300. A summary of the health
insurance and ACA parameters are given in Table 3.3.
3.5.3 Life cycle parameters, medical expenditures, and the earnings process
The calibration of the life cycle and technology parameters follows closely that of Conesa
et al. (2018). Each period in the model is one year. Households enter the economy at
age 20, retire from the labor force at age 66, and have a maximum life span of 100 years.
The population growth rate is set to 1.1 percent per year. I pick a depreciation rate of
0.059 and set capital’s share of income to 0.360 to match commonly used values in the
literature. Lastly, I pick σ to match an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.5 and
86
set the consumption share in intratemporal utility to match the median estimates in French
(2005).
Recall that the stochastic process for health is given by a stationary finite-state Markov
process that depends on the agent’s current age and health. Using data from the MEPS, I
estimate health transition and survival probabilities by running probit regressions of next
period’s health on current age, age squared, health, and interaction terms.
I calibrate the total factor productivity parameter to generate a GDP per capita of 1 in the
steady state of the benchmark model. The discount factor is calibrated to match a capital-
to-output ratio of 3. Next, I set the consumption floor to match average annual food stamps
between 2006 and 2010 of about $1,300, and set the Social Security replacement rate to
match the $11,900 average annual benefits of households without a college degree.
I follow Conesa et al. (2018) and split medical expenses for each age group into three
categories: low, high, and catastrophic, where the three categories correspond to the av-
erage value of medical expenses between the 0-60th percentile, 60-99.9th percentile, and
99.9-100th percentile, respectively. That is, for each age group, I first pool all medical
expenses in the MEPS, compute the 60th and 99.9th percentile, and then let the three ex-
penditure states be given by the mean value of medical expenses between these data cutoffs.
Lastly, I detrend the derived series using a log-linear trend, and scale the expenses to match
the health-expenditure-to-GDP ratio observed in the data. A summary of the life cycle and
technology parameters are given in Table 3.4.
The earnings process is calibrated to match the empirical earnings distribution in the US
as reported by Díaz-Giménez et al. (1997). To match the top decile of this distribution, I
follow Castañeda et al. (2003) and choose a right skewed labor productivity shock process
characterized by two key features: a high labor productivity at the top and a low probability
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Table 3.4: Life cycle and technology parameters
Parameter Description Target or source Value
Determined outside the model
Maximum life span (100 years) 81
jr Retirement age (66 years) 47
Population growth rate 0.011
α Capital income share 0.360
δ Depreciation rate 0.059
γ Consumption share in utility French (2005) 0.574
Risk aversion IES=0.5 2.742
Determined jointly in equilibrium
A Total factor productivity GDP per capita = 1 0.764
β Discount factor Capital to output = 3 0.936
b SS replacement rate Avg. SS benefits non-college ≈ 11,900 0.329
c Consumption floor Avg. food stamps ≈ 1,300 0.028
Scale for health care costs Health expend. to GDP = 0.165 1.902
Notes: The table lists the life cycle and technology parameters that are determined outside the model
and those that are determined jointly in equilibrium. A period in the model is one year.
of transitioning to this state. This process has been shown to induce the large savings of
wealth-rich and earnings-rich households that is needed to generate the concentration of
wealth observed in the data.7 As shown in the first part of Table 3.5, both the model with
and without Chapter 7 successfully matches the earnings distribution observed in the data,
where each data quintile is given by the ratio of group to sample average. The compari-
son of the wealth distribution in the second part of the table shows that both models also
generate a concentration of wealth that is comparable to what we observe in the data.
3.6 Results
The following subsection studies the general equilibrium effects of eliminating Chapter
7Recent research by De Nardi et al. (2016) have shown that the process used by Castañeda et al. (2003)
is inconsistent with the data. In particular, they find that the earnings risk faced by the top earners in the
data is insufficient to generate the observed concentration of wealth. I leave it for future work to study the
sensitivity of my results to alternative labor productivity processes.
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Table 3.5: Labor earnings distribution (percent)
Quintiles Top
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100 Gini
Data -0.40 3.19 12.49 23.33 61.39 12.38 16.37 14.76 0.63
Benchmark 0.00 4.13 11.05 19.84 64.98 12.10 16.47 14.78 0.63
w/o Chapter 7 0.00 4.14 11.05 19.84 64.97 12.11 16.47 14.78 0.63
Notes: The table reports the labor earnings distribution in the model and the data. Cells denote shares of
total. Data source: Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2013).
Table 3.6: Wealth distribution (percent)
Quintiles Top
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 90-95 95-99 99-100 Gini
Data -0.39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55 0.78
Model 0.23 0.41 3.18 16.91 79.26 16.98 27.18 15.92 0.77
w/o Chapter 7 0.23 0.41 3.29 17.03 79.04 16.92 27.08 15.86 0.77
Notes: The table reports the wealth distribution in the model and the data. Cells denote shares of total.
Data source: Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2013).
7. This experiment enables me to capture the effect of Chapter 7 on insurance coverage,
welfare, macroeconomic aggregates, and the price of health services. I then extend the
model to incorporate the key features of the Affordable Care Act to examine whether the
results regarding the effects of Chapter 7 on the demand for health insurance depend on the
specifics of the health insurance environment.
3.6.1 Chapter 7 consumer bankruptcy
This section studies the economic implications of an unexpected elimination of Chapter 7.
The ability to file for bankruptcy leave households with a tradeoff: buy insurance today
to lower expected medical costs tomorrow, or do not buy insurance today and file for a
debt discharge tomorrow if hit by a severe medical shock. Eliminating the second option
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increases the cost of being uninsured. As a result, more households are likely to buy health
insurance in an economy without Chapter 7. On the other hand, households are also likely
to save more in an economy without bankruptcy. This raises capital and therefore wages
in general equilibrium, which in turn lowers the likelihood that an agent will qualify for
Medicaid, the latter of which follows from the Medicaid income and asset eligibility tests.
The overall effect of Chapter 7 on the uninsurance rate thus depends on the relative effects
of these two channels.
Table 3.6 compares the insurance take-up rate across working-age households in the
steady state of the economy with and without Chapter 7. Eliminating the ability to file for
bankruptcy increases private insurance enrollment across working-age households by 2.0
percentage points. With a working-age population of about 190 million, this translates into
an increase in private insurance take-up by 3.8 million individuals. This result suggests
that 8 percent of the uninsured working-age population would take up coverage if they did
not have the option to file for medical bankruptcy. Medicaid enrollment, on the other hand,
declines by 0.2 percentage points across working-age households, or 0.3 million people.
As a result, I find that eliminating Chapter 7 leads to a 1.8 percentage point increase in
the insurance coverage rate. These results, coupled with the fact that only 0.1 percent of
households file for medical bankruptcy in the benchmark model, show that the ability to
file for bankruptcy has an economically significant implication for the insurance coverage
rate.
The reduction in Medicaid enrollment is driven by two forces. First, higher private in-
surance enrollment lowers out-of-pocket medical expenses. This increases income net of
health expenses, and hence reduces the likelihood that an agent passes the Medicaid medi-
cally needy income test. Next, households respond to the removal of Chapter 7 by increas-
ing saving. Higher saving affects Medicaid eligibility directly through the medically needy
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Table 3.7: Insurance take-up rate across working-age agents in economy with and without
Chapter 7
Variable Without Chapter 7
(percentage change from benchmark)
Insurance coverage rate 1.8
Private insurance enrollment 2.0
Medicaid enrollment -0.2
Notes: The table compares the steady state of the economy with and without
Chapter 7 (see the text for details). The the first row reports the percentage
point changes in the insurance coverage rate. The final two rows decompose
the change into private insurance enrollment and Medicaid enrollment.
asset test. The additional saving also translates into higher wages, which in turn lowers the
percentage of households that pass the Medicaid income tests.
I next solve for a transition path between the steady state of the economy with and with-
out bankruptcy. This enables me to quantify how quickly the insurance take-up rate will
adjust following the change in the bankruptcy law. Taking the costs of transitioning be-
tween the steady states into account also enables me to better quantify the welfare effects
of the policy reform. I find that the private insurance take-up rate increases by 1.7 per-
centage points during the first two years following the elimination of Chapter 7. That is,
85 percent of the change in the private insurance take-up rate takes place within the first
two years of the transition. Given the size of the working-age population, this translates
into an increase in the private insurance take-up rate of 3.3 million people. In comparison,
about 11.7 million people took up coverage during the first two years of the Affordable
Care Act. This shows that reforming the bankruptcy laws can have considerable short run
implications for the insurance coverage rate.
Lastly, I study the welfare effects of the ability to file for medical bankruptcy. I find that
79.6 percent of the population is better off in the economy with medical bankruptcy because
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of the implicit insurance provided by this option. To quantify the welfare effects on those
that benefit and lose from the reform, I compute the dollar value of how much wealth must
change in the initial steady state to make the agents weakly better off in the economy with
bankruptcy than in the transition to the economy without bankruptcy. I find that those that
benefit from the reform experience an average welfare gain that is equivalent to receiving
$400 higher wealth in the steady state with bankruptcy. In contrast, those that lose from
the reform experience an average welfare loss that is equivalent to a $2,900 reduction in
wealth. Consequently, I find that aggregate welfare is higher in the economy with medical
bankruptcy.
3.6.2 ACA
This subsection studies how the results derived earlier depend on the specifics of the health
insurance environment. In particular, I examine whether the results regarding the effect of
Chapter 7 on the demand for health insurance is robust to introducing the key features of
the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in the model. The ACA introduced
several mechanisms to improve health insurance coverage, quality, and affordability. First,
health insurance providers were no longer permitted to refuse to cover or charge individuals
more because of pre-existing conditions. Second, it introduced an insurance exchange
marketplace where households could buy insurance at group-based premium rates with
subsidies for households with income between 133 and 400 percent of the FPL. Third, it
introduced penalties for not buying insurance. Lastly, it expanded the Medicaid program to
cover all households with income less than 133 percent of the FPL.8
I build on work by Pashchenko and Porapakkarm (2013) and Jung and Tran (2016) and
8Following a recent Supreme Court ruling, states are free to opt out of the Medicaid expansion. As of 2016,
19 states have not expanded Medicaid.
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incorporate the different features of the ACA by changing four aspects of the benchmark
model. First, I change the price of the health insurance to pi j. That is, insurance companies
are no longer permitted to condition the price of the insurance on current health. Next,
I introduce a subsidy for purchasing insurance. To be eligible for a subsidy, the value
of which varies with the agent’s income and cost of insurance, an agent must have income
between 133 and 400 percent of the FPL. Let y˜(s, `) denote household income and τsub (s, `)
denote the subsidy for purchasing insurance, where s denotes the agent’s type and ` is her
labor supply. The subsidy is then given by:
τsub(s, `) =

max
(
0,pi j−0.020y˜(s, `)
)
i f y˜(s, `)< 1.33FPL
max
(
0,pi j−0.030y˜(s, `)
)
i f 1.33FPL≤ y˜(s, `)< 1.50FPL
max
(
0,pi j−0.040y˜(s, `)
)
i f 1.50FPL≤ y˜(s, `)< 2.00FPL
max
(
0,pi j−0.063y˜(s, `)
)
i f 2.00FPL≤ y˜(s, `)< 2.50FPL
max
(
0,pi j−0.081y˜(s, `)
)
i f 2.50FPL≤ y˜(s, `)< 3.00FPL
max
(
0,pi j−0.095y˜(s, `)
)
i f 3.00FPL≤ y˜(s, `)≤ 4.00FPL
(15)
Households that are not covered by Medicare or Medicaid must buy private health insur-
ance or pay a penalty.9 The penalty, p¯iP (s, `), varies with the agent’s income and is given
by the maximum of $695 and 2.5 percent of the agent’s income net of the minimum tax
filing amount, τ . That is, p¯iP (s, `) is given by:
p¯iP (s, `) = max{$695,0.025(y˜(s, `)− τ)} (16)
9The penalty is waived if the price of health insurance exceeds 8 percent of the agent’s income.
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Lastly, I incorporate the Medicaid expansion by expanding Medicaid eligibility to all agents
with income less than 133 percent of the FPL.
I find that the previous results regarding the effect of Chapter 7 on the demand for health
insurance still applies in the post-ACA environment. In particular, I find that the ability to
file for medical bankruptcy lowers private insurance enrollment by 1.5 percentage points
across the working-age population. Similarly, Medicaid enrollment is 0.1 percentage points
higher in the economy with Chapter 7. As a result, I find that eliminating the ability to file
for medical bankruptcy would lower the uninsurance rate by 1.4 percentage points.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter developed an equilibrium life cycle model with incomplete markets and
heterogeneous agents to examine the general equilibrium effects of medical bankruptcy.
I used the model to study the effects of an unexpected elimination of Chapter 7, which
allowed me to quantify the effects of medical bankruptcy on the private insurance take-up
rate, Medicaid enrollment, welfare, and macroeconomic aggregates. The ability to file for
bankruptcy lowered private insurance enrollment across the working-age population by 2.0
percentage points and increased Medicaid enrollment by 0.2 percentage points. Eliminating
Chapter 7 would thus lead to a 1.8 percentage point reduction in the uninsurance rate.
Similar results were obtained in Section 3.7.2, where I extended the model to include the
key features of the Affordable Care Act.
Next, I computed a transition path between the economy with and without Chapter 7,
and found that 85 percent of the increase in the private insurance take-up rate took place
within the first two years following the removal of bankruptcy. Medicaid enrollment, on
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the other hand, was found to gradually decline during the transition. As a result, I found
that most of the increase in the coverage rate would take place within the first years of
the transition. Lastly, I examined the welfare implications of Chapter 7. I found that 79.6
percent of the population was better off in the environment with bankruptcy because of the
implicit insurance provided by this option.
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Chapter 4
Comparing welfare across the states of
the US
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4.1 Introduction
A large literature has used economic models and various statistics to compare welfare
across countries. Instead of comparing welfare across countries, this chapter compares
welfare across the states of the US. The chapter is motivated by the considerable hetero-
geneity in GDP per capita across states, ranging from 32,000 dollars in Mississippi to
68,600 dollars in Alaska, compared to a national average of 50,600.1 Moreover, total per-
sonal consumption per capita ranges by a factor of 1.7, and life expectancy at birth varies
by almost 7 years. These differences are likely to have large implications for welfare as
measured by the expected lifetime utility of being born in a given state. This chapter quan-
tifies these welfare differences by computing how much consumption must change in all
ages in a given state to make an agent indifferent between being born in this state and an-
other state. I allow states to differ in longevity, consumption, and educational attainment,
all of which have large implications for welfare.
My analysis shows that there exists considerable heterogeneity in welfare across the
states. To illustrate, I find that consumption must be scaled down by 28 percent in all
ages in the state with the highest welfare level, Massachusetts, to make a hypothetical
agent indifferent between living her entire life in Massachusetts and the state with the
median welfare level, Iowa, and has to be scaled down by an additional 19 percentage
points to make her indifferent between living her entire life in Massachusetts and the state
with the lowest welfare level, Mississippi. A decomposition of the welfare results shows
that heterogeneity in consumption per capita accounts for the largest share of the variation
in welfare levels. That said, variations in both life expectancy at birth and educational
attainment also contribute considerably to the heterogeneity in welfare levels across the
1Numbers are in constant 2010 dollars.
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states.2
Finally, I compare welfare across time by quantifying how much each state’s welfare
level has grown between 2000 and 2013, taking into account state-specific changes in con-
sumption per capita, mortality risk, and educational attainment. I find that the variation in
welfare across the states is very persistent. Accordingly, although the lower ranked states in
2000 generally experienced a higher welfare growth than the higher ranked states in 2000,
there does not appear to be evidence of rapid convergence toward similar welfare levels.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides summary
statistics for all the states. In particular, I compare GDP per capita, consumption per capita,
educational attainment, infant mortality rates, and life expectancy at birth across the states.
Section 4.3 develops a model that can be used to quantify the welfare implications of these
state-characteristics. Section 4.4 explains how I calibrate the model. In particular, it ex-
plains how I derive state-specific survival probabilities and state-specific consumption pro-
files, and how I calibrate the parameters of the utility function. The following section
compares welfare levels across the states and over time. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Data
I start by comparing income, consumption, educational attainment, and longevity across
the states, all of which will play key roles in the following welfare analysis. Appendix Table
B.1 provides summary statistics for all the states. Columns two and three report average
GDP per capita and average consumption per capita for the period 2010 to 2017 across
2I split individuals into three educational groups: those without a high school degree, those with a high
school degree but without a college degree, and those with a college degree, where a college degree refers
to individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree or a minimum of four years of college.
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the states. Consumption refers to total personal consumption expenditures as reported by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Population statistics are obtained from the inter-
censal population estimates reported by the Census. Both the GDP and consumption series
have been deflated by means of the region-specific CPI numbers reported by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The table shows that GDP per capita varies considerably across the states,
from 32,000 dollars in Mississippi to 68,600 dollars in Alaska. Compared to an average
GDP per capita of 50,600 dollars in the United States, this means that the richest state has
a 36 percent higher GDP per capita relative to the national average, while the poorest state
has a 37 percent lower GDP per capita relative to the national average. Similarly, consump-
tion per capita ranges by nearly a factor of two between the states, from a low of 25,700
dollars in Mississippi to a high of 44,800 dollars in Massachusetts.
The fourth and fifth column of appendix Table B.1 compare the educational attainment
of the 25+ year-old population across the states as reported by the Census. On average,
13.2 percent of 25+ year-olds did not have a high school degree in the United States be-
tween 2010 and 2017. The percentage without a high school degree varies from a low of
7.3 percent in Montana to a high of 18.1 percent in California. The variation in college at-
tainment—measured by the share of the 25+ year-old population with at least a bachelor’s
degree or a minimum of four years of college—is even higher. Compared to a national
average of 30.0 percent, only 19.2 percent of 25+ year-olds in West Virginia have a college
degree. In contrast, 40.2 percent of 25+ year-olds in Massachusetts has at least a bachelor’s
degree. To illustrate, this means that West Virginia currently has the same college attain-
ment as Massachusetts had during the 1980s.3 As will be evident below, these differences
in educational attainment have large implications for both consumption and longevity, and
will hence have considerable implications for welfare.
3Historical educational attainment series by state and year are obtained from the Current Population Survey.
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The final two columns of appendix Table B.1 report state-specific infant mortality rates
and life expectancy at birth. Both statistics are derived from the Underlying Cause of Death
database reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). It is well
known that the United States has a high infant mortality rate compared to other developed
countries. On average, 5.9 infants per 1000 live births died before the age of 1 in the
United States between 2010 and 2017, about twice as high as in countries likes France
and Germany, and about three times as high as in Japan. This national average, however,
masks significant heterogeneity across the states, ranging from 4.1 in Massachusetts to 9.1
in Mississippi. To illustrate, this means that the current infant mortality rate in Mississippi
is as high as the national infant mortality rate in the United States around 1990. Life
expectancy by state is derived from state-specific mortality rates. It refers to the expected
lifespan of a hypothetical individual who lives her entire life in the state she is born in.4
Appendix Table C.1 shows that average life expectancy at birth between 2010 and 2017
varied by 6.9 years across the states, from a low of 74.7 years in Mississippi to a high
of 81.6 years in Hawaii. Put differently, this means that the current life expectancy in
Mississippi is as low as the average life expectancy in the United States 30 years ago.
So far, I have shown that states vary considerably in GDP per capita, consumption per
capita, educational attainment, and longevity, all of which have important implications for
welfare. Next, I look at the cross-state relationship between these variables. The left panel
of Figure 4.1 shows that GDP per capita and longevity are positively correlated. That is,
states with higher GDP per capita are more likely to have higher life expectancy at birth.
Similarly, consumption per capita and longevity are positively correlated. This is illustrated
4The welfare analysis in Section 4.5 allows for the possibility of state-to-state migration. Consequently, the
life expectancy of an individual who is born in a given state will not be equal to the life expectancy of
a hypothetical individual who resides in that particular state her entire life. Note, however, that the life
expectancy estimates that allow for migration and the estimates that do not allow for migration are very
similar since, across all states, only 1-5 percent of residents migrate to another state on an annual basis.
These numbers are derived from annual state-to-state migration statistics as reported by the Census.
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Figure 4.1: Relationship between life expectancy and GDP per capita, and relationship
between life expectancy and consumption per capita
Notes: The left panel depicts the relationship between GDP per capita and life expectancy at birth. State-
specific GDP per capita has been normalized by average GDP per capita in the United States. The right panel
depicts the relationship between consumption per capita and life expectancy at birth. State-specific consump-
tion per capita has been normalized by average consumption per capita in the United States. Consumption
refers to total personal consumption expenditures. Life expectancy at birth is derived from the Underlying
Cause of Death database reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. All numbers refer to
average values for the period 2010 to 2017.
in the right panel of Figure 4.1, which shows that states with higher consumption per capita
are more likely to have higher life expectancy at birth. This means that a comparison of
welfare across states based solely on a comparison of GDP per capita or consumption per
capita would understate the magnitude of the welfare differences between the states since
it would fail to account for the fact that individuals in richer states are not only likely to
consume more during each year of life but are also likely to benefit from a considerably
higher life expectancy.
Figure 4.2 shows that states with lower educational attainment are more likely to have
lower life expectancy at birth. The left panel of Figure 4.2 plots the relationship between the
share of 25+ year-olds without a high school degree and life expectancy at birth. With some
notable exceptions such as California, I find a negative relationship between these variables.
Similarly, as depicted in the right panel of Figure 4.2, I find a positive relationship between
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Figure 4.2: Relationship between life expectancy and educational attainment
Notes: The left panel depicts the relationship between the percentage of 25+ year-olds without a high school
degree and life expectancy at birth. The right panel depicts the relationship between the percentage of 25+
year-olds with a college degree and life expectancy at birth, where a college degree refers to at least a bach-
elor’s degree or a minimum of four years of college. Educational attainment by state is obtained from the
Census. Life expectancy at birth is derived from the Underlying Cause of Death database reported by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. All numbers refer to average values for the period 2010 to 2017.
the share of 25+ year-olds with a college degree and life expectancy at birth.
To summarize, I have shown that consumption and life expectancy are positively cor-
related across states, and that states with lower shares of high school dropouts and higher
shares of college graduates have higher life expectancy. These differences are likely to have
large implications for welfare. The next section develops a model that can flexibly account
for these differences. The model is an extension of the model used by Jones and Klenow
(2016) to study welfare differences across countries. After mapping the model to the data
in Section 4.4, I then use the model in Section 4.5 to quantify the magnitude of the welfare
differences between the states.
4.3 Model
Let an agent’s idiosyncratic state be given by her age, j, state of residence, s, and ed-
ucational level, e. Agents derive utility from consumption, c, which follows a stochas-
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tic process that depends on the agent’s age, education, and state. Let E jse denote age-
education-state-specific expected consumption. Agents are subject to mortality risk, 1−
ψ jse, which varies with the agent’s age, education, and state. Let Ψ jse =∏ j−1k=0ψkse denote
the education-state-specific probability of surviving from age 0 to age j. I assume that
agents that survive until age J die with probability one. For now, assume that agents live
their entire life in the state they are born in. Moreover, assume that the educational level
is revealed at birth and stays constant over the agent’s lifespan. Both assumptions will be
relaxed later in the chapter. Expected lifetime utility in state s is then given by
U (s) =∑
e
pi (e|s)
[
E0seu(c)+
J
∑
j=1
β jΨ jseE jseu(c)
]
, (1)
where β denotes the discount rate and pi (e|s) is the state-specific probability of educational
level e.
Let U (s;λ ) denote expected lifetime utility in state s if consumption is multiplied by a
factor λ in all ages:
U (s;λ ) =∑
e
pi (e|s)
[
E0seu(λc)+
J
∑
j=1
β jΨ jseE jseu(λc)
]
. (2)
I quantify the welfare difference between states si and s−i by computing how much con-
sumption must adjust in all ages in state si to make an agent indifferent between living her
life in state si and s−i. This corresponds to deriving the scaling factor, λ , that solves
U (si;λ ) =U (si−1;1) . (3)
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The next section explains how I derive the inputs required for the welfare analysis.
4.4 Calibration
The following two subsections explain how I compute the age-education-state-specific
survival probabilities and how I derive the stochastic process for consumption. The final
subsection explains how I calibrate the parameters of the utility function.
4.4.1 Survival probabilities
This subsection explains how I derive age-education-state-specific survival probabilities,
ψ jse. I start by estimating age-state-specific survival probabilities, ψ˜ js. To do this, I first
pool all death records for the period 2010 to 2017 from the Underlying Cause of Death
database reported by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The CDC
reports each individual’s age and state of legal residence at the time of death in the United
States, with age top-coded at age 85. For 0–84 year-olds, I first compute raw age-state-
specific survival probabilities directly from observed mortality rates. I then smooth the
logarithm of the mortality rates by means of step-wise sixth-order polynomials in age.
This helps ensure smooth mortality rates for smaller states like Vermont and Rhode Island.
Unreported results show that the smoothed mortality rates fit the raw data almost perfectly.
Beyond the age of 84, I approximate age-state-specific survival probabilities by means of
Gompertz survival models. In a Gompertz model, the logarithm of the mortality rate is
linear in age, ln
(
m js
)
= αs+βs j, where m js is the mortality rate of j-year-olds in state s,
and where αs and βs are state-specific coefficients. This log-linear approximation fits the
CDC mortality rates for 40+ year-olds almost perfectly. I then use the estimated mortality
regressions to predict age-state-specific survival probabilities for 85–100 year-olds. Note
that all the results in Section 4.5 are robust to allowing for a higher maximum life span than
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100 years.
Next, I compute age-education-specific survival probabilities, ψ˜ je. To do this, I first
pool all death records for the period 2010–2017 from the National Vital Statistics System
(NVSS) reported by the CDC. The NVSS reports each individual’s age and educational
attainment at the time of death in the United States, with age top-coded at age 85. For
confidentiality purposes, the NVSS does not report individuals’ state of residence or the
state of occurrence at the time of death. I split individuals into three educational groups:
less than high school, high school graduates but no college degree, and college graduates,
where college graduates refer to individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree or a minimum
of 4 years of college. For brevity, I refer to the three groups as individuals without a high
school degree, high school graduates, and college graduates. I then compute age-education-
specific survival probabilities for 20–84 year-olds directly from observed mortality rates.
Since the NVSS top-codes age at age 85, I assume that the difference in age-specific sur-
vival probabilities between individuals without a high school degree, with a high school
degree, and with a college degree for 85+ year-olds is the same as that for 84-year-olds.
Mortality probabilities by age and educational attainment are depicted in Figure 4.3. As
shown in the graph, across all age groups, college-educated individuals are subject to a
lower mortality risk than high school graduates, and high school graduates are subject to a
lower mortality risk than individuals without a high school degree.
I then use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the period 2010–2017 to
compute the distribution of educational attainment by age and state, Λ jes. That is, for each
age and state, I compute the percentage of individuals without a high school degree, with
a high school degree, and with a college degree. Since the CPS top-codes age at age 80, I
assume that the distribution of educational attainment by age and state for 80+ year-olds is
the same as that for 79-year-olds.
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Figure 4.3: Mortality probability by age and educational attainment
Notes: The graph plots mortality probabilities by age and educational attainment. No high school refers to
individuals without a high school degree, high school refers to individuals with a high school degree but less
than a bachelor’s degree, and college refers to individuals with at least a bachelor’s degree. Data source:
NVSS.
Lastly, given an initial guess, ψ˜ jes, I obtain age-education-state-specific survival proba-
bilities, ψ jes, by adjusting ψ˜ jes to match the age-state-specific survival probabilities from
the CDC, ψ˜ js, and the age-education-specific survival probabilities from the NVSS, ψ˜ je.
This corresponds to deriving the scaling terms, a jes, that solve the following system of
equations:
ψ˜ js = ∑eΛ jesa jesψ˜ jes
ψ˜ j2− ψ˜ j1 = a j2sψ˜ j2s−a j1sψ˜ j1s
ψ˜ j3− ψ˜ j2 = a j3sψ˜ j3s−a j2sψ˜ j2s.
(4)
The age-education-state-specific survival probabilities in the model are then given byψ jes=
a jesψ˜ jes. Note that this approach relies on the assumption that the age-specific education
survival premia are common across all states. That is, for each age, I assume that the
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mortality difference between individuals with and without a high school degree, and the
mortality difference between college graduates and high school graduates, are common
across all states.
4.4.2 Consumption
I assume that consumption is drawn from a lognormal distribution with age-education-
state-specific mean, µ jes, and variance, σ2jes. This subsection explains how I derive these
parameters. I start by obtaining age-specific consumption profiles. To do this, I use data
from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The CEX provides detailed data on ex-
penditures, income, and demographics for a representative sample of US households. Fol-
lowing Aguiar and Hurst (2013), I limit the analysis to nondurables excluding health care
and education expenditures. I exclude the latter two categories because the utility from
consuming these goods varies considerably over the life cycle. Each expenditure category
is deflated by means of good/service-specific CPI series as in Aguiar and Hurst (2013).
The CEX reports consumption at the household level. I follow Jones and Klenow (2016)
and allocate consumption uniformly across household members. I test the sensitivity of the
welfare results to this assumption by also considering alternative ways to allocate consump-
tion across household members such as the OECD’s equivalent scale. I adjust spending for
cohort effects by splitting the individuals into 5-year cohort bins. I then compute life cy-
cle consumption profiles for each cohort, following which I average the profiles across the
cohorts. Lastly, I smooth the consumption profiles by means of fourth-order polynomials
in age. Since I do not observe individuals older than 94 in the data, I extrapolate the con-
sumption series for 95-100 year-olds. Let the logarithm of the derived consumption profile
be denoted by c˜ j.
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Following Storesletten et al. (2004), I compute age-education-specific consumption pro-
files by focusing on consumption of 25–85 year-old household heads in the CEX. That is, I
use the age and educational attainment of the household head to derive education-specific
consumption profiles. I continue to split individuals into three educational groups: less than
high school, high school graduates but no college degree, and college graduates. Building
on Aguiar and Hurst (2013), I define the household head as follows. If the household has
more than one self-defined heads, I let the head be defined as the male one, the employed
one, the oldest one, the married one, or the one with the highest educational attainment, in
that order. I continue to adjust for cohort effects by splitting the household heads into 5-year
cohort bins. Next, for each educational group, I compute life cycle consumption profiles
for each cohort, average the profiles across the cohorts, and then smooth the profiles by
means of fourth-order polynomials in age.
Let the logarithm of the derived consumption profile for those without a high school
degree be defined as c˜ j1. Moreover, let p j2 = c˜ j2/c˜ j1 be defined as the age-specific ratio
between consumption of high school graduates and high school dropouts, and p j3 = c˜ j3/c˜ j1
be defined as the age-specific ratio between consumption of college graduates and high
school dropouts. For each j, let c j1 be defined as the solution to the following equation:
c˜ j = Λ j1c j1+Λ j2p j2c j1+Λ j3p j3c j1 (5)
where Λ je is the age-education-specific distribution of individuals obtained using data from
the CPS for the period 2010 to 2017. The adjustment of c˜ je to c je is necessary since the
former refers to total consumption of household heads rather than individual consumption.
Lastly, I scale c je by a state-specific factor as to match total personal consumption expen-
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ditures per capita, Cpcs , as reported by the BEA for the period 2010 to 2017:
Cpcs =∑
j
∑
e
Λ jesas exp
(
c je
)
. (6)
The age-education-state-specific mean of the lognormal consumption process is then given
by µ jes = asc je. For now, I let the variance of the process be independent of state and
education, and let the variance be given by the average variance across age groups. I relax
this assumption later in the chapter. This gives a value of 0.553 for the standard deviation
of the consumption process, close to the value of 0.538 used by Jones and Klenow (2016).
4.4.3 Preferences
Building on Hall and Jones (2007), I let preferences be represented by a non-homothetic
utility function:
u(c) = b+
c1−γ
1− γ , (7)
where γ governs the relative risk aversion and the constant term in the utility function,
b, governs the value of life in the model. I set γ equal to 2 for the benchmark analysis.
Following Jones and Klenow (2016), I calibrate b such that a 40-year-old individual, facing
the average cross-state age-specific consumption uncertainty, has a value of remaining life
equal to $7 million in 2010 prices. This gives a value of 4.82 for b, close to the value of
5.00 derived by Jones and Klenow (2016). The discount factor, β , is set to 0.99.
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4.5 Results
This section reports the quantitative results. The next subsection quantifies the welfare
differences across the states. Subsection 4.5.2 quantifies each state’s welfare growth rate
between 2000 and 2013.
4.5.1 Welfare across states
This section quantifies the expected lifetime utility of a hypothetical agent who lives her
entire life in the state she is born in. I assume that the agent is subject to the age-education-
state-specific mortality risk, consumption uncertainty, and educational uncertainty dis-
cussed in Section 4.4. Since educational attainment has increased considerably in the
United States since the 1960s, I assume that agents draw their educational attainment from
the current distribution of 25–29 year-olds.
Appendix Table B.2 summarize the results. Each cell reports the factor by which con-
sumption must be scaled down in all ages in the state with the highest expected lifetime
utility to make an agent indifferent between living her entire life in that state and any other
state. The states are listed in descending order from highest to lowest welfare level, using
the benchmark parameterization discussed in Section 4.4. I find that the states with the five
highest welfare levels are, in descending order, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,
New Jersey, and New Hampshire. In contrast, the five states with the lowest welfare level
are, in ascending order, Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and West Virginia.
Consistent with the high cross-state variation in GDP per capita reported in Section 4.2, I
find that the magnitude of the welfare differences are substantial. To illustrate, appendix
Table B.2 shows that consumption would have to be scaled down by 28 percent in all ages in
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Massachusetts to make an agent indifferent between living her entire life in Massachusetts
and the state with the median welfare level, Iowa, and would have to be scaled down by 47
percent to make her indifferent between living her entire life in Massachusetts and the state
with the lowest welfare level, Mississippi.
To understand the determinants of the cross-state welfare differences, I compute welfare
results under alternative parameterizations of the model. In particular, I study counterfac-
tual cases where all states have the same survival probabilities, ψ jse, average consumption,
µ jse, and college attainment, pi (e|s), as Massachusetts. Recall that most states have lower
life expectancy than Massachusetts. Consequently, I find that the welfare differences are
generally smaller in the model where all the states have the same survival probabilities as
Massachusetts. To illustrate, I find that consumption has to be scaled down by 20 percent to
make an agent indifferent between living her life in Massachusetts and Maryland under the
benchmark parameterization of the model but by 17 percent if the two states had the same
survival probabilities. Differences in mortality risk thus account for some of the variation
in welfare across the states.
Column four of appendix Table B.2 reports the welfare results from the model when all
the states have the same average consumption levels. A comparison of column two and
four shows that variation in consumption accounts for most of the variation in welfare. As
an example, I find that the welfare difference between Massachusetts and Kentucky would
decrease by 23 percentage points if Kentucky had the same average consumption level
as Massachusetts. That is, consumption would have to be scaled down by 18 percent to
equalize welfare levels in Massachusetts and Kentucky if the two states had the same aver-
age consumption levels, compared to a 41 percent required reduction under the benchmark
parameterization.
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Figure 4.4: Relationship between welfare and GDP per capita
Notes: The graph plots the relationship between welfare and GDP per capita, where welfare refers to expected
lifetime utility (see Section 4.3 for details). All calculations are based on data for the period 2010 to 2017.
GDP per capita has been normalized by GDP per capita in Massachusetts and welfare has been normalized
by welfare in Massachusetts. The red line is the 45 degree line. The correlation between welfare and GDP
per capita is 0.80.
The final column of the table reports the results from the counterfactual case where all
the states have the same educational attainment as Massachusetts. I find that differences in
educational attainment account for some of the variation in welfare across the states. To il-
lustrate, I find that the welfare difference between Massachusetts and Texas would decrease
by 5 percentage points if Texas had the same educational attainment as Massachusetts.
I end this subsection by comparing two welfare measures. Figure 4.4 plots the relation-
ship between welfare measure in this chapter and the more commonly used welfare mea-
sure, GDP per capita. Although there are important differences between the two measures,
the graph shows that the two measures generally provide similar results. The correlation
between the two welfare measures across all the states is 0.80.
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4.5.2 Welfare across time
Instead of comparing welfare across states, this subsection compares welfare across time.
In particular, for each state, I quantify the change in welfare between 2000 and 2013 by
computing how much consumption must adjust in all ages in 2000 to make an agent indif-
ferent between the 2000 and 2013 environment. The results are reported in appendix Table
B.3. To lower the prevalence of business cycle fluctuations, I pool data for 7-year-periods.
Accordingly, 2000 and 2013 refer to average values between 1997–2004 and 2010–2017.
The second column of appendix Table B.3 reports the state-specific annual growth rate
in welfare, ordered from the state with the highest welfare growth rate over this time pe-
riod, North Dakota, to the state with the lowest welfare growth rate, Arizona. There is
considerable heterogeneity in welfare growth rates over this time period, ranging from 0.4
to 3.1 percent per year. To better understand the determinants of these growth rates, col-
umn two, three, and four of appendix Table B.3 report the annual growth rate in GDP per
capita and consumption per capita, and the total change in life expectancy at birth over this
time period.5 I find large variations in the growth rate of consumption per capita across
the states, ranging from an annual growth rate of 0.3 percent in Arizona to 3.0 percent in
North Dakota. Hence, heterogeneous growth rates in consumption per capita account for
most of the variation in the welfare growth rates. The final column shows large variations
in life expectancy changes across the states. Compared to the average 1.8 year increase
in life expectancy at birth in the United States between 2000 and 2013, life expectancy
only increased by 0.2 years in West Virginia. In contrast, life expectancy at birth increased
by more than 2.5 years in California, Maryland, New York, and Vermont. Accordingly,
heterogeneity in life expectancy changes account for some of the variation in the welfare
5GDP per capita increased by 0.8 percent per year in the United States over this time period. The slow growth
rate compared to the historical value of 2 percent per year is partially due to the Great Recession.
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growth rates.
Figure 4.5 compares the ranking of welfare levels across the states over this time period.
The horizontal axis gives the ranking in 2000 and the vertical axis gives the ranking in
2013, with a value of 1 referring to the lowest ranked state and a value of 50 referring to the
highest ranked state. States that lie below the 45 degree line such as Colorado declined on
the welfare level ranking between 2000 and 2013, while states that lie above the 45 degree
line such as North Dakota increased on the welfare level ranking over this time period. The
graph shows a high degree of persistence in welfare ranking over time, with most states
clustered around the 45 degree line. The correlation between the welfare level ranking
in 2000 and 2013 is 0.93. This enables me to draw two conclusions. First, as noted in
Subsection 4.5.1, there exists considerable heterogeneity in expected lifetime utility levels
across states. Second, these welfare differences are persistent. Hence, although appendix
Table B.3 shows that the lower ranked states in 2000 generally experienced a higher welfare
growth than the higher ranked states in 2000, there does not appear to be evidence of rapid
convergence toward similar welfare levels.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter developed a model to quantify the welfare differences across the states of
the US. Consistent with the data, the model allowed the states to differ in longevity, con-
sumption, and educational attainment. The analysis showed that there exists considerable
heterogeneity in welfare across the states. In particular, I found that consumption had to
be scaled down by 28 percent in all ages in the state with the highest welfare level, Mas-
sachusetts, to make a hypothetical agent indifferent between living her entire life in Mas-
sachusetts and the state with the median welfare level, Iowa, and had to be scaled down
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Figure 4.5: Comparing ranking of welfare levels across states in 2000 and 2013
Notes: The graph plots each state’s welfare level ranking in 2000 and 2013. Numbers for 2000 are based on
average values between 1997 and 2004, and numbers for 2013 are based on average values between 2010 and
2017. The correlation between the welfare level ranking in 2000 and 2013 is 0.93.
by 47 percent to make her indifferent between living her entire life in Massachusetts and
the state with the lowest welfare level, Mississippi. A decomposition of the welfare results
showed that heterogeneity in consumption per capita accounted for the largest share of the
variation in welfare levels, with a smaller share accounted for by life expectancy at birth
and educational attainment.
I also compared welfare across time by quantifying how much each state’s welfare had
grown between 2000 and 2013, taking into account state-specific changes in consumption
per capita, mortality risk, and educational attainment. I found that the variation in welfare
across the states is very persistent. Accordingly, although the lower ranked states in 2000
generally experienced a higher welfare growth than the higher ranked states in 2000, there
does not appear to be evidence of rapid convergence toward similar welfare levels.
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This section provides additional material. I start by listing the variables that are included
in the construction of the frailty index both in the MEPS and in the HRS. Next, I provide
additional information about the effects of medical spending, income, and education on
frailty. The following subsection shows how age, education, and frailty affect labor market
outcomes. Next, I show how age, education, and frailty affect medical expenditure risk.
I then show that individuals with employer provided insurance tend to be richer, more
educated, and less frail. The next subsection provides evidence that healthier consumption
goods tend to be more expensive on average than unhealthy goods. Next, I show that
richer and educated individuals lead healthier lives on average, and provide estimates of the
magnitude of these relationships. Lastly, I use the benchmark model to study how income
inequality and differences in educational attainment affect life expectancy inequality in the
United States.
Frailty index
Table A.1 lists all the variables that are included in the construction of the frailty index
in the MEPS. Following conventions in gerontology (see for example Searle et al., 2008),
I include all disease diagnoses such a whether or not the individual has been diagnosed
with for example cancer or diabetes. I also include functional limitations such as whether
or not the individual needs help with activities of daily living such as eating, dressing, or
bathing, cognitive limitations, and a measure of whether or not the individual needs help
with instrumental activities of daily living such as taking medications or preparing meals.
I follow the same approach to construct frailty indices in the HRS. A list of the variables
used to construct the index is given in Table A.2.
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Effects of medical spending, income, and education on frailty
This section provides additional details about how medical spending, income, and educa-
tion affect frailty. To do this, I run an instrumental variable regression of frailty in year 2
on frailty, medical spending, income, and education in year 1, where I instrument medical
spending by the density of physicians by county. I also control for smoking, exercising,
county of residence, occupation, a cubic in age, county of residence, state plus cohort fixed
effects, marital status, gender, and race. The results are reported in Table A.3. I find that,
conditional on initial health, medical spending has no significant effect on frailty. In con-
trast, both education and higher income are predictive of lower next-period frailty. Note,
however, that income is also likely to be endogenous, and it would therefore be incorrect to
say that these results establish a causal effect of income on frailty, even though the regres-
sion controls for educational attainment, medical spending, and initial frailty.
Medical spending
This section provides additional details about how age and frailty affects medical spend-
ing risk. Recall from Section 2.4.4 that I split medical expenses into three categories in the
MEPS: less than $1,000, between $1,000 and $40,000, and greater than $40,000. To com-
pute transition probabilities between the medical expenditure states, I first run an ordered
logistic regression of medical spending in year 2 on medical spending, age and frailty in
year 1. I also controls for gender, race, and interaction terms between age, frailty, and med-
ical spending. The results are reported in Table A.4. Transition probabilities between the
medical expenditure states can then be derived by applying the standard ordered logistic
formula.
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Labor earnings
This section provides additional details about how age, education, and frailty affect labor
market outcomes. I start by examining how labor productivity as measured by hourly wages
is affected by frailty. Table A.5 reports the results from an ordinary least squares regression
of the logarithm of hourly wages in year 2 on the logarithm of hourly wages, age, frailty,
and education in year 1. The regression also controls for gender, race, and a quadratic in
age. I restrict the MEPS sample to individuals aged 20 to 64 that work at least 10 hours per
week. The regression shows that labor productivity is negatively affect by an increase in
frailty. In particular, I find that the semi-elasticity of hourly wages with respect to frailty is
−0.16.
Next, I examine how frailty affects hours worked, focusing on 20 to 64 year-olds that
work at least 10 hours. To do this, I regress the logarithm of hours worked per week in year
2 on the logarithm of hours worked per week, age, frailty, and education in year 1. I also
control for gender, race, and a quadratic in age. The results are reported in Table A.6. The
regression shows that individuals respond to an increase in frailty by reducing the number
of hours worked per week. In particular, I find that the semi-elasticity of hours worked per
week with respect to frailty is −0.032.
Following Conesa et al. (2018), I estimate the agents’ deterministic life cycle labor
productivity by regressing the logarithm of hourly wages on age, education, higher-order
moments of age, and interaction terms. Figure A.1 plots the derived labor productivity
profiles by age and education, where I have normalized productivity at age 20 to 1.
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Relative price of healthy and unhealthy goods
Drewnowski and Specter (2004) and Drewnowski (2010) show that low-energy dense goods
tend to be more expensive than high-energy dense goods. Figure A.2 illustrates this rela-
tionship between cost and energy density for 9 consumption categories: vegetables; fruit;
milk and milk products; eggs; dry beans, legumes, nuts, and seeds; meat, poultry, and fish;
sugar, sweets, and beverages; grain products; and fats, oils, and salad dressings. Here, en-
ergy cost is measured by cost per 100 kcal and energy density is measured by kcal per 100
gram.
The prices of low energy dense goods have also increased more rapidly than the prices
of high energy dense goods. Using consumer price index data from the BLS for the period
1980 to 2015, I find that the price for low-energy dense goods such as fruits and vegetables
have increased faster than the price for high-energy dense goods such as sugar, sweets, and
carbonated drinks. This is illustrated in Figure A.3.
Health behavior by income and education It is well known that the relationship be-
tween income and health, and the relationship between education and health, are partially
driven by differences in health behavior. That is, richer and educated individuals lead
healthier lives on average. This subsection provides estimates of the magnitude of these
relationships. To do this, I use data from the National Health and Nutrition Examina-
tion Survey (NHANES), a program of studies designed to assess the health and nutritional
status of adults and children. The NHANES provides detailed cross-sectional data on de-
mographics, socioeconomic characteristics, dietary information, and health indicators for a
nationally representative sample of Americans.
I start by testing for differences in healthy eating by income and educational attainment,
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focusing on the following measures: a self-rated measure of how healthy the respondent’s
diet is, a measure of whether the respondent can afford to eat balanced meals, and how
often the respondent has fruits, dark green vegetables, and soft drinks available at home.
To maintain consistency with Subsection 2.2.1, I continue to focus on college and non-
college educated individuals, where college refers to individuals with at least a four-year
college degree. All regressions control for the respondent’s self-rated health, a quadratic
in age, gender, and race. The results are reported in Table A.7. I find that educated and
high-income individuals are more likely to have fruits and dark green vegetables available
at home. Similarly, these groups are more likely to afford balanced meals. In addition, I
find that educated individuals are less likely to have soft drinks available at home and more
likely to rate their own diet as healthy.
Next, I test for differences in exercising, smoking, and drinking rates by income and edu-
cational attainment, focusing on whether or not the respondent engages in any vigorous- or
moderate-intensity sports, fitness, or recreational activities, whether the respondent smokes
or drinks alcoholic beverages, and how much the respondent smokes or drinks conditional
on smoking and drinking, respectively. As earlier, all regressions control for the respon-
dent’s self-rated health, a quadratic in age, gender, and race. The results, which are reported
in Table A.8, show that educated and high-income individuals are more likely to engage in
both vigorous- and moderate-intensity recreational activities. Similarly, these groups are
less likely to smoke. Moreover, I find that, conditional on smoking, educated individuals
smoke fewer cigarettes per day than non-educated individuals. Lastly, I find that both edu-
cated and high-income individuals are more likely to drink alcoholic beverages. That said,
I find that, conditional on drinking, non-educated and low-income individuals drink more
than educated and high-income individuals. These findings confirm that educated and high-
income individuals lead healthier lives, and hence that the relationships between income,
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education, and frailty documented in Subsection 2.2.1 are partially driven by differences in
health behavior.
Determinants of life expectancy inequality This section provides additional details
about the determinants of life expectancy inequality. In particular, I study how income
inequality and differences in educational attainment affect life expectancy inequality as
measured by the difference in life expectancy at age 40 by income quartile. I do this by
comparing the benchmark model with two counterfactual model environments. First, I as-
sume that frailty transitions are exogenous and hence independent of consumption. Next, I
assume that education affects income but not frailty transitions. This latter model enables
me to decompose the income effect of education from the direct health effect of education.
Recall from equation (1) that frailty transitions depend on current frailty, age, education,
and consumption of healthy goods, P( f , j,e,ch). To understand how income inequality af-
fects life expectancy inequality, I solve a counterfactual model where frailty transitions are
exogenous and hence independent of consumption. In practice, I set ch in the agents’ frailty
transitions equal to a common constant, c¯h, and adjust its value such that average life ex-
pectancy at age 20 in this model is identical to the life expectancy in the benchmark model.
That is, frailty transitions are assumed to be given by P( f , j,e, c¯h), where c¯h is identical for
all agents. Note that although income does not directly affect life expectancy in the envi-
ronment with exogenous frailty transitions, income will still be positively correlated with
longevity due to the negative effect of frailty on earnings. Lastly, since frailty transitions
are independent of consumption, I assume that the relative price of unhealthy goods, p, is
equal to one, and hence that agents are indifferent between the two consumption goods.
Table A.9 compares life expectancy and life expectancy inequality in the two models.
129
The first row reports average life expectancy at age 20. Due to the adjustment of c¯h, average
life expectancy is identical in the benchmark model and the model with exogenous frailty
transitions, as can be seen by comparing the columns labeled benchmark and exogenous.
Next, I compare life expectancy inequality in the two models. To compute life expectancy
by income, I first rank the 40-year-olds in the model by income and split the agents into four
income quartiles. I then simulate life trajectories by using the policy functions derived from
the model, the Markov processes for the shocks, and the age and frailty-specific survival
probabilities. This enables me to compute how many of the agents will survive until a
given age. To illustrate, conditional on being in the top income quartile at age 40, I can
compute how many of these agents will survive until age 41, 42, etc. Life expectancy by
income quartile at age 40 is then given by the number of years an agent in a given income
quartile can expect to live. The second row of Table A.9 reports how much longer the
richest 25 percent of 40-year-olds can expect to live compared to the poorest 25 percent.
A comparison of the two models shows that life expectancy inequality is 7.01 years in
the benchmark model, but only 1.72 years in the model with exogenous frailty transitions.
That is, life expectancy inequality by income quartile is 5.30 years lower in the model with
exogenous, consumption-independent, frailty transitions.
This finding that life expectancy inequality is 76 percent lower in the model with exoge-
nous frailty transitions suggests that income inequality is a key driver of life expectancy
inequality in the United States. Consistent with this finding, both life expectancy inequality
and income inequality have increased considerably over time. Recent research by Chetty
et al. (2016) shows that, between 2001 and 2014, life expectancy increased at an annual
rate of 0.20 years for men in the top earnings quartile, but only 0.08 years for men in the
bottom earnings quartile. Similarly, a number of papers have documented the increase in
earnings inequality in the United States. As an example, using data from the Survey of
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Consumer Finances, Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2013) show that the GINI coefficient of labor
earnings increased from 0.61 to 0.67 between 1989 and 2013. Recent research by Guve-
nen et al. (2017) also shows that lifetime earnings inequality has increased in the United
States. Using individual earnings histories from the Social Security Administration, they
document that, from the 1967 cohort to the 1983 cohort, only the top 10 percent of the
distribution of men experienced a significant increase in lifetime earnings. More than 75
percent of the distribution of men, on the other hand, experienced either no increase, or
even declining, gains in lifetime earnings.
I run two counterfactuals to examine how differences in educational attainment affect
life expectancy inequality. First, I assume that all agents have the same frailty transitions
as college educated agents. That is, I assume that frailty transition probabilities are given
by P( f , j,ec,ch), where ec denote college-educated. Next, I assume that all agents have
the same frailty transitions as non-college educated agents, and hence that frailty transition
probabilities are given by P( f , j,enc,ch), where enc denotes non-college-educated. In both
cases, I continue to assume that education affects income through its effect on labor pro-
ductivity. These counterfactuals enable me to decompose the income effect of education
from the direct health-protective effect of education.
The results are reported in the last two columns of Table A.9. A comparison of the
benchmark column and the college column shows that life expectancy at 20 is 78.90 years
in the benchmark model, but 79.69 years in the model where all agents have the same frailty
transitions as college-educated agents. Note, however, that this 0.79 year increase in life
expectancy is likely to provide a lower bound on the effect of education on longevity. This
follows from the assumption that education only affects life expectancy through its effect on
frailty transitions. This assumption is consistent with the finding in Pijoan-Mas and Ríos-
Rull (2014) that socioeconomic characteristics such as education, income, and wealth are
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health-protecting, but have otherwise little impact on two-year mortality rates conditional
on health. That said, given the large difference in life expectancy by education documented
by a number of studies, it is possible that educated individuals have lower mortality rates
even after controlling for other factors such as age, frailty, gender, race, and health behavior.
I also find that education has a large effect on life expectancy inequality. As reported in
Table A.9, the difference in life expectancy inequality is 1.54 years, or 22 percent, lower
in the model where all agents are subject to college educated frailty transitions than in the
benchmark model. Lastly, I compare the benchmark model environment with an economy
where all agents have the same frailty transitions as non-college educated agents. As shown
in Table A.9, life expectancy is 0.33 years lower in this model than in the benchmark model.
Moreover, I find that life expectancy inequality is 0.41 years, or 6 percent, higher in the
model where all agents are subject to non-college educated frailty transitions.
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Figure A.1: Labor productivity profiles by age and education
Notes: The graph plots labor productivity profiles by age and education. Productivity profiles are derived
from a regression of the logarithm of wages on age, education, higher-order moments of age, and interaction
terms between age and education. Data source: MEPS.
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Table A.2: Variables included in the frailty index (HRS)
Dependent variable: Variable Cutoff points
Ever had high blood pressure Yes = 1, No = 0
Ever had diabetes Yes = 1, No = 0
Ever had cancer Yes = 1, No = 0
Ever had lung disease Yes = 1, No = 0
Ever had heart problems Yes = 1, No = 0
Ever had stroke Yes = 1, No = 0
Ever had arthritis Yes = 1, No = 0
Difficulty walking across room Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty dressing Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty bathing or showering Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty eating Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty getting out of bed Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty using the toilet Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty using a map Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty using a phone Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty managing money Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty taking medication Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty shopping for groceries Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty preparing meals Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty walking several blocks Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty jogging a mile Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty walking one block Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty sitting for two hours Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty getting up from chair Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty climbing several flights of stairs Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty climbing one flight of stairs Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty stooping/kneeling/crouching Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty lifting/carrying 10lbs Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty picking up a dime Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty reaching/extending arms up Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Difficulty pushing/pulling large objects Can’t do = 1, Yes = 0.5, No = 0
Notes: The table lists the variables used to construct the frailty index in the HRS. Cutoff points
for the different variables are given in the second column. All binary variables such as whether
or not the person ever had cancer are assigned a value of 0 if the person does not have this
health deficit and a value of 1 if the person does have this health deficit. All variables that
include more than two responses are assigned values from 0 to 1 depending on the number of
possible responses. See Section 2.2.1 for details.
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Table A.3: Frailty determinants: IV regression results
Dependent variable: Frailty in year two
Frailty 0.905
(0.004)
Age 0.001
(0.0005)
Logarithm of medical spending -0.005
(0.008)
Logarithm of income -0.004
(0.0004)
Education -0.004
(0.0007)
Constant 0.0005
(0.008)
Centered R2 0.850
Number of observations 56933
Notes: The table reports results from an instrumental variable regression
of frailty in year 2 on frailty, age, medical spending, income, and education
in year 1, where medical spending has been instrumented by the density
of physicians by county (see ongoing work by Bairoliya et al. (2018) for
further details). I also control for gender, race, a cubic in age, county of
residence, and state plus cohort fixed effects. Education is split into two
categories: college and non-college, where college refers to individuals
with at least a 4-year college degree. Non-college refers to everyone else.
The sample includes individuals aged 20 to 85. Numbers in parentheses
denote clustered standard errors. Sample weights are used to account for
complex survey design. Data source: MEPS.
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Table A.4: Medical spending: Ordered logistic regression results
Dependent variable: Medical spending category in year two
Medical spending 1.192
(0.072)
Age 0.012
(0.002)
Frailty 7.271
(0.347)
Cutoff 1 3.081
(0.114)
Cutoff 2 8.456
(0.116)
R2 0.261
Number of observations 77640
Notes: The table reports results from an ordered logistic regression of medical spend-
ing in year 2 on medical spending, age, and frailty in year 1. The regression also con-
trols for gender, race, and interaction terms between age, frailty, and medical spending.
Medical spending is split into three categories: less than $1,000, between $1,000 and
$40,000, and greater than $40,000. Education is split into two categories: college
and non-college, where college refers to individuals with at least a 4-year college de-
gree. Non-college refers to everyone else. The cutoffs reflect the predicted cumulative
probabilities at covariate values of zero. The sample includes individuals aged 20 to
85. Numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors. Sample weights are used
to account for complex survey design. Data source: MEPS.
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Table A.5: Labor productivity: Ordinary least squares regression results
Dependent variable: Logarithm of hourly wages in year 2
Logarithm of hourly wage 0.594
(0.008)
Age 0.014
(0.002)
Frailty -0.155
(0.043)
Education 0.167
(0.007)
Constant 0.850
(0.041)
R2 0.468
Number of observations 32401
Notes: The table reports results from an ordinary least squares regression of the log-
arithm of hourly wages in year 2 on the logarithm of hourly wages, age, frailty, and
education in year 1. The regression also controls for gender, race, and a quadratic in
age. Education is split into two categories: college and non-college, where college
refers to individuals with at least a 4-year college degree. Non-college refers to every-
one else. The sample includes individuals aged 20 to 64 that work at least 10 hours per
week. Numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors. Sample weights are used
to account for complex survey design. Data source: MEPS.
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Table A.6: Hours worked: Ordinary least squares regression results
Dependent variable: Logarithm of hours worked per week in year 2
Logarithm of hours worked per week 0.863
(0.007)
Age 0.001
(0.001)
Frailty -0.032
(0.011)
Education 0.003
(0.002)
Constant 0.480
(0.029)
R2 0.788
Number of observations 40885
Notes: The table reports results from an ordinary least squares regression of the
logarithm of hours worked per week in year 2 on the logarithm of hours worked per
week, age, frailty, and education in year 1. The regression also controls for gender,
race, and a quadratic in age. Education is split into two categories: college and non-
college, where college refers to individuals with at least a 4-year college degree. Non-
college refers to everyone else. The sample includes individuals aged 20 to 64 that
work at least 10 hours per week. Numbers in parentheses denote robust standard
errors. Sample weights are used to account for complex survey design. Data source:
MEPS.
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Table A.7: Healthy eating: Ordinary least squares regression results
Dependent variable
Regressor Fruits Vegetables Soft drinks Healthy diet Balanced meals
Education 0.154 0.085 -0.413 0.239 0.027
(0.025) (0.032) (0.051) (0.019) (0.006)
Income 0.053 0.051 -0.003 0.005 0.081
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.005) (0.002)
R2 0.057 0.032 0.033 0.199 0.133
Number of observations 9632 9631 9632 22907 25590
Notes: The table reports results from 5 ordinary least squares regressions: “How often do you have fruits
available at home,” “How often do you have dark green vegetables available at home,” “How often do
you have soft drinks available at home,” “How healthy is your overall diet,” and “How often could you not
afford to eat balanced meals.” For questions 1, 2, 3, and 5, higher values means more often. For question 4,
higher values means more healthy. All regressions control for self-rated health, a quadratic in age, gender,
and race. Income refers to the ratio of family income to the federal poverty level, which is topcoded at 5.
Education is split into two categories: college and non-college, where college refers to individuals with at
least a 4-year college degree. Non-college refers to everyone else. The samples include individuals aged
20 to 85. Numbers in parentheses denote robust standard errors. Sample weights are used to account for
complex survey design. Data source: NHANES.
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Figure A.2: Relationship between price and energy density for selected consumption goods
Notes: The graph plots the relationship between average energy cost, as measured by the cost per 100 kcal,
and average energy density, as measured by kcal per 100 gram, for selected consumption goods. Source:
Drewnowski (2010).
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Figure A.3: Trends in price indices for selected consumption goods
Notes: The left panel shows how the price index for selected consumption goods have evolved since 1982.
Each index has been normalized to 100 between 1982 and 1984. Data source: BLS.
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Table B.1: Descriptive statistics
State Income and consumption Educational attainment Longevity
GDP/capita Cons./capita No HS Bachelor’s+ Infant mortality Life expec.
(1000s of (1000s of (% of 25+) (% of 25+) (deaths per (years)
2010 dollars) 2010 dollars) 1000 births)
United States 50.6 34.3 13.2 30.0 5.9 78.7
Alabama 37.2 27.8 15.7 23.6 8.5 75.2
Alaska 68.6 40.3 7.9 28.3 5.4 77.9
Arizona 39.3 29.3 13.9 27.6 5.7 79.4
Arkansas 35.8 27.5 15.1 21.3 7.6 75.7
California 56.8 36.1 18.1 31.7 4.4 80.9
Colorado 51.8 35.1 9.2 38.4 4.9 80.0
Connecticut 65.6 43.3 10.2 37.5 5.0 80.6
Delaware 65.4 36.4 11.3 30.0 7.6 78.3
Florida 39.4 33.5 13.0 27.5 6.3 79.5
Georgia 44.6 29.5 14.4 29.0 7.0 77.3
Hawaii 51.5 37.4 8.9 30.9 5.6 81.6
Idaho 35.7 28.7 10.3 25.9 5.2 79.2
Illinois 54.8 35.9 12.0 32.5 6.4 78.9
Indiana 45.0 30.7 12.1 24.4 7.3 77.1
Iowa 49.9 32.0 8.5 26.9 5.0 79.4
Kansas 47.2 31.2 9.8 31.4 6.1 78.4
Kentucky 38.9 28.5 15.7 22.4 6.8 75.6
Louisiana 46.9 29.6 16.5 22.6 7.9 75.7
Maine 39.3 37.2 8.4 29.1 6.3 78.6
Maryland 55.5 38.0 10.7 37.9 6.6 78.9
Massachusetts 65.8 44.8 10.1 40.8 4.1 80.3
Michigan 42.1 33.1 10.3 27.0 6.8 77.9
Minnesota 53.9 37.9 7.5 33.9 4.9 80.7
Mississippi 32.0 25.7 17.3 20.7 9.1 74.7
Missouri 43.6 33.0 11.5 27.2 6.5 77.3
Montana 39.6 33.8 7.3 29.9 5.7 78.4
Nebraska 54.0 34.1 9.3 29.7 5.4 79.4
Nevada 45.2 34.2 14.7 23.1 5.4 77.9
New Hampshire 50.7 42.8 7.7 35.0 4.3 79.7
New Jersey 57.6 42.9 11.2 37.1 4.6 80.1
New Mexico 39.9 29.3 15.5 26.3 5.6 77.8
New York 67.0 40.9 14.3 34.3 4.8 80.5
North Carolina 44.4 28.6 13.9 28.7 7.1 77.7
North Dakota 64.4 40.7 8.2 28.3 6.2 79.5
Ohio 46.5 33.4 10.8 26.2 7.4 77.2
Oklahoma 42.9 28.4 12.9 24.2 7.5 75.6
Oregon 44.4 33.5 10.1 31.1 4.9 79.4
Pennsylvania 49.7 36.5 10.6 28.9 6.5 78.3
Rhode Island 48.2 36.8 13.7 32.0 6.0 79.6
South Carolina 36.8 28.7 14.3 26.1 7.0 76.7
South Dakota 49.9 35.5 9.0 27.2 6.8 79.1
Tennessee 43.0 29.2 14.3 25.1 7.3 76.0
Texas 51.5 31.5 17.9 27.7 5.8 78.5
Utah 44.3 29.3 8.7 31.5 5.2 79.5
Vermont 44.7 40.5 8.2 35.9 4.4 79.7
Virginia 52.3 36.8 11.6 36.5 6.2 79.0
Washington 57.4 36.5 9.5 33.2 4.5 80.0
West Virginia 35.4 29.2 14.9 19.2 7.2 75.1
Wisconsin 47.2 34.3 8.8 28.1 6.0 79.4
Wyoming 61.5 35.3 7.5 26.0 5.5 78.4
Notes: The table provides summary statistics for each age. All numbers refer to average values for
the period 2010 to 2017. See the text for details.
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Table B.2: Welfare across states
State Benchmark Same survival Same consumption Same education
Massachusetts 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Connecticut 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.99
New York 0.95 0.92 1.01 0.97
New Jersey 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.97
New Hampshire 0.90 0.92 0.95 0.93
North Dakota 0.89 0.90 0.94 0.94
Minnesota 0.87 0.85 1.00 0.89
Vermont 0.86 0.87 0.95 0.89
Hawaii 0.84 0.80 0.98 0.90
Alaska 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.88
California 0.82 0.79 0.97 0.88
Rhode Island 0.80 0.80 0.94 0.84
Maryland 0.80 0.83 0.92 0.82
Washington 0.79 0.79 0.94 0.84
Virginia 0.79 0.81 0.93 0.82
Illinois 0.79 0.81 0.94 0.81
Pennsylvania 0.78 0.81 0.91 0.81
South Dakota 0.77 0.79 0.92 0.82
Maine 0.76 0.78 0.90 0.81
Nebraska 0.76 0.76 0.95 0.79
Colorado 0.76 0.76 0.95 0.78
Delaware 0.75 0.78 0.88 0.80
Wisconsin 0.75 0.75 0.94 0.79
Wyoming 0.74 0.76 0.88 0.80
Iowa 0.72 0.72 0.95 0.75
Oregon 0.72 0.72 0.92 0.76
Florida 0.71 0.72 0.92 0.76
Nevada 0.70 0.73 0.86 0.77
Montana 0.70 0.73 0.89 0.74
Michigan 0.70 0.73 0.89 0.73
Ohio 0.69 0.73 0.86 0.73
Texas 0.69 0.70 0.89 0.74
Missouri 0.68 0.72 0.86 0.72
Kansas 0.68 0.70 0.91 0.70
Utah 0.66 0.67 0.92 0.70
Indiana 0.65 0.68 0.86 0.68
Arizona 0.64 0.64 0.91 0.68
Idaho 0.63 0.63 0.91 0.67
Georgia 0.62 0.65 0.87 0.66
Louisiana 0.61 0.66 0.82 0.64
North Carolina 0.61 0.63 0.88 0.64
Tennessee 0.61 0.65 0.84 0.63
New Mexico 0.60 0.63 0.84 0.65
South Carolina 0.60 0.63 0.86 0.63
Kentucky 0.59 0.63 0.82 0.62
West Virginia 0.59 0.64 0.81 0.62
Oklahoma 0.58 0.62 0.81 0.61
Arkansas 0.57 0.61 0.82 0.61
Alabama 0.56 0.60 0.80 0.60
Mississippi 0.53 0.57 0.78 0.56
Notes: Each cell reports the factor by which consumption must be scaled down
in all ages in the state with the highest expected lifetime utility, Massachusetts, to
make an agent indifferent between living her entire life in that state and any other
state. Same survival, Same consumption, and Same education refer to the coun-
terfactual cases where all states have the same survival probabilities, ψ jse, same
average consumption, µ jse, and same educational attainment as Massachusetts.
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Table B.3: Growth rates in welfare, GDP/capita, consumption/capita, and change in life
expectancy between 2000 and 2013
State Welfare growth GDP/capita growth Cons./capita growth Life expec. change
North Dakota 3.1 4.5 3.0 0.8
South Dakota 2.3 2.1 2.2 1.2
Montana 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.1
Wyoming 1.8 2.4 1.7 1.5
Vermont 1.7 1.0 1.5 2.8
Hawaii 1.7 1.2 1.6 1.8
West Virginia 1.6 1.2 1.6 0.2
Nebraska 1.6 2.0 1.5 1.3
New York 1.6 1.3 1.4 2.5
Louisiana 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.6
Alaska 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.3
Iowa 1.4 1.7 1.4 0.8
Virginia 1.4 0.7 1.4 0.6
Wisconsin 1.4 1.0 1.3 1.3
Oklahoma 1.4 1.8 1.3 0.5
Rhode Island 1.4 0.9 1.3 1.6
Mississippi 1.4 0.6 1.3 1.1
Maryland 1.3 1.4 1.1 2.5
Kansas 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.0
Illinois 1.3 1.0 1.1 2.1
New Hampshire 1.3 0.6 1.2 1.1
Ohio 1.3 0.7 1.2 0.9
Arkansas 1.3 0.6 1.2 0.7
California 1.3 1.1 1.1 2.6
Maine 1.2 0.4 1.1 1.1
Pennsylvania 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.5
New Mexico 1.2 0.2 1.1 0.9
New Jersey 1.2 0.3 1.0 2.4
Nevada 1.2 -0.4 1.0 2.1
Washington 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.8
Idaho 1.1 0.2 1.0 1.1
Massachusetts 1.1 1.0 0.9 2.0
Missouri 1.1 0.5 1.0 1.2
Delaware 1.1 -0.3 0.9 1.8
Indiana 1.1 0.7 1.0 0.9
Minnesota 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.5
South Carolina 1.0 0.1 0.9 1.8
Connecticut 1.0 0.4 0.8 1.9
Utah 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.1
Michigan 1.0 -0.1 0.9 1.3
Texas 1.0 1.2 0.8 1.8
Florida 1.0 0.1 0.8 2.0
Kentucky 1.0 0.5 0.9 0.5
Oregon 0.9 0.4 0.8 1.7
Alabama 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.9
North Carolina 0.8 0.2 0.6 1.9
Tennessee 0.7 0.5 0.6 1.2
Georgia 0.7 -0.3 0.5 2.2
Colorado 0.5 0.2 0.4 1.8
Arizona 0.4 -0.2 0.3 2.0
Notes: The second column reports the state-specific growth rate in welfare between 2000
and 2013 as measured by expected lifetime utility (see the text for details). Column three
and four report the annualized percentage growth in GDP/capita and consumption/capita.
The final column reports the total change in life expectancy at birth over this time period
(in years).
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